



Shaul Arieli Messianism Meets Reality

The Israeli Settlement Project
in Judea and Samaria:
Vision or Illusion, 1967-2016



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November 2017

Dedicated to the late Prof. Elisha Efrat, Laureate of the Israel Prize in Geography

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The danger of national error was inherent to our experience as a land of vision, since a vision seeks to change reality. However, the greatness of the vision, upon which its realization is contingent, is grounded in its **realism**. This ensures that while the vision seeks to rise beyond reality, the former's feet remain firmly implanted in the latter. This is the difference between a **vision** and a **fantasy** that is suspended on the wings of illusion."

- Yehoshafat Harkabi¹

¹ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Vision, Not Fantasy – The Lesson of the Bar Kochba Revolt and Contemporary Political Realism* (Jerusalem: Domino, 1982) (in Hebrew), p. 183.

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Introduction

Over the years, the Israeli settlement enterprise in the West Bank has reflected the position of different Israeli governments regarding the political future of this area. On the basis of security, religious, and historical considerations, these governments have sought – and continue to seek – to ensure that all or part of this area will come under Israeli sovereignty.² Despite this, Israel has refrained since 1967 from applying its law, jurisdiction, and administration to this area, with the exception of 70 square kilometers annexed to the city of Jerusalem immediately after the war.

Over the decades that have passed since the war, four key plans can be identified for Jewish settlement in the West Bank. These plans sought to create demographic and spatial conditions that would permit the realization of the political goal: the annexation of some or all of the West Bank, while maintaining the Zionist vision of a democratic state with a Jewish majority. The first of these, formulated in June 1967, was the **Allon Plan**. Yigal Allon, who was serving at the time as Minister of Labor and Deputy Prime Minister, submitted a plan entitled “The Future of the Territories and Methods of Dealing with the Refugees.” The plan was not brought before the government for approval,³ but the government of Levi Eshkol (from the Ma’arach party) sought to use it in order to establish the Jordan River as Israel’s security border. To this end, the government planned to annex a strip with a width of 15 kilometers along the Jordan Valley and the northern Dead Sea. Israel also sought to widen the “Jerusalem Corridor,” a narrow strip including the west of the city that reached just six kilometers at its widest point. To this end, an area known as the “Greater Jerusalem Triangle” was added to the Allon Plan. The three corners of this triangle are the current location of Modi’in Illit to the northwest, Gush Etzion to the southwest, and the Inn of the Good Samaritan east of Ma’ale Adumim (see Map 1).

The second plan was formulated by **Ariel Sharon**, who served as Minister of Agriculture and chairperson of the Ministerial Committee for Settlement Affairs in Menachem Begin’s first government, formed in 1977. Sharon sought to expand the Allon Plan by adding a western security zone to the east of the Green Line, with the goal of containing the major areas of Palestinian settlement, aligned along Route 60

² From 1967 through 1992, all the Israeli governments also considered that the Gaza Strip was destined to become part of the State of Israel; see: Shaul Arieli, *Border between Us and You* (Tel Aviv: Books in the Attic and Yediot Acharonot, 2012) (in Hebrew), Borders chapter. This study will not address the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip following the 1967 War, which had a total population of just 8,000 people prior to their evacuation in 2005 as part of Israel’s “Disengagement Plan.”

³ Benny Morris, *One State Two States* (New Haven: Yale University Press), pp. 84-86; Nachum Barnea, “On the Mountain and in the Valley,” *Davar*, 12 September 1969.

down the central mountain ridge, within a ring of Israeli security zones (see Map 2). The Israeli government approved the plan on 2 October 1977, and it was presented to the Knesset on 9 November of the same year.

The third plan, launched in 1978, was formulated by **Matityahu Drobles**, head of the World Zionist Organization's Settlement Division,⁴ who sought to realize and elaborate on the Sharon Plan (see Map 3). His plan was based on the Israeli government's position that the West Bank (and the Gaza Strip) would come under Israeli sovereignty. The plan sought to expand Jewish settlement into the central mountain ridge and to enlarge the existing settlements, as well as to establish "blocs" of settlements on both sides of the Green Line in order to obliterate the physical boundary.

The fourth plan was the **Super Zones Plan**, formulated by the Settlement Division in 1997. The plan constituted a response to the Oslo Accords and the transfer of powers to the Palestinian Authority in Areas A and B (see Map 4). The Super Zones Plan sought to limit the areas to be transferred to the Palestinian Authority, to contain the Palestinian autonomous areas by means of an Israeli spatial presence to the west and the east (in keeping with the first two plans), and to reinforce the existing blocs of Jewish settlements.

This study aims to examine the extent to which these four plans were successful in realizing their declared planning, with reference to the strategic goals that guided their authors and the governments that acted in accordance with their provisions, and with reference to the impact on Israel's proposals for the final borders during its negotiations with the Palestinians. I will begin by explaining the background to the formulation of these plans, before presenting the plans themselves and examining the extent to which they were implemented. I will then present a picture of Jewish settlement as of the end of December 2016, and lastly I will offer my conclusions concerning the success of these plans relative to Israel's positions as presented during the negotiations with the Palestinians.

⁴ Following the 1967 War, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol charged the Jewish Agency with the task of establishing settlements beyond the Green Line. In order to protect the Jewish Agency's budgets, which come mainly from overseas donations and a US grant, the task was transferred to the World Zionist Organization, which established a Settlement Division in 1968. Minutes No. 60 of a Meeting of the State Audit Committee, *Nevo Website*, 23 December 2003. Until 1992 the Settlement Division operated alongside the Jewish Agency's Settlement Department, but since 1993 the two bodies have been separated.

Background

The armistice line of 1949, known as the “Green Line,”⁵ passed for most of its course along, or on the margins of, the central mountain ridge in the Land of Israel / Palestine, dividing the territory between Israel and Jordan (the West Bank). The line does not follow any natural feature or historical boundary; neither does it coincide with the borders of village land or Bedouin grazing and nomadic areas. The line was delineated with little attention to the physical and human geographical features in the area through which it passes.⁶

The West Bank has an area of 5,868 square kilometers, and prior to the Six Day War of 1967 had a population of some 860,000 Palestinians. The area can be divided into three vertical strips extending from the north to the south. The easternmost strip is the sparsely-populated Jordan Valley. This is also the lowest area in topographical terms, rising from 440 meters below sea level to sea level. The next strip includes the ridges of the Judean and Samarian mountains. This is steep and rocky terrain, with peaks reaching a maximum height of around 1,000 meters. This strip includes most of the main Palestinian cities of the West Bank. To the west lie the fertile green foothills of Judea and Samaria. The western foothill strip has a more moderate topography, good soil for agriculture, and abundant water sources. The area overlooks the coastal plain and is constitutes the most desirable part of the West Bank. Most of the Palestinian agricultural villages are situated in this strip.

Until 1967, due to the political reality – and despite the arbitrary nature of the Green Line – Israel accepted the boundary as an impermeable barrier between itself and Jordan, and did not develop any national plan implying that it recognized any contiguity or continuity between Israel and the West Bank in any physical sense, with the exception of the road super zone.

The first plan prepared by Israel for the development of the West Bank was formulated by the Planning Division of the Interior Ministry. The plan related to the period 1967-1969 and was entitled *Judea and Samaria: Guidelines for Regional Physical Planning*. The guiding approach behind the plan was the future development of the region for the benefit of its local residents, gradually bringing them to an economic level comparable to that of the State of Israel in as many fields as possible. The goal of the plan was to set physical objectives as a basis for planning provisions in order to direct development in Judea and Samaria in keeping with accepted geographical principles. The point of departure in these areas was to maximize the benefit to the area and to ensure efficient development in physical

⁵ The armistice line was marked in green on the maps.

⁶ Moshe Brawer, *Israel's Borders* (Tel Aviv: Yavne, 1988) (in Hebrew).

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terms, advancing the local population and raising its standard of living. The planning guidelines were based on several directions and principles: development of the agricultural and export sectors; development of Jerusalem and its satellite cities; reasonable growth of the Arab cities; strengthening the regional economy through industry and petty industry, particularly in the cities; developing the Jordan Valley; exploiting the aquifer water sources; eliminating the slums and refugee camps; improving transportation routes; exploiting tourism potential for the benefit of the country as a whole; and strengthening the border margins of Judea and Samaria through an affinity to the State of Israel. Israel's official planning super zone in the late 1960s did not see any need for Jewish settlement in the territories, and certainly not through the type of intensive construction that would be seen later.

This plan was never implemented, and Israel never formulated clear policy regarding the future of the West Bank. Accordingly, different Israeli institutions implemented partial activities intended to ensure the rapid population of the territories by Jews. As noted, the political purpose of Jewish settlement in the West Bank was to create demographic and spatial conditions permitting the annexation of part or all of this area. In order to assess whether this purpose was achieved, the geographer Elisha Efrat suggests that we must examine whether it met the following conditions: Does the number of Jewish settlers in the area constitute a critical mass? Has a high level of density of population been created, allowing for the development of contiguous contact and internal cohesion? Has a hierarchy of settlements been created on the basis of size and location? Does the settlement relate to the land and are the settlements based on agriculture and local industry? Is the deployment of the population and the settlements based on exclusive, or at least safe, main transportation arteries?⁷

⁷ Elisha Efrat, *Geography of Occupation* (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2002) (in Hebrew).

The Allon Plan


After the 1967 War, Yigal Allon and most of the other government ministers opposed any territorial solution based on the return of the West Bank to the King of Jordan. During a government discussion, Allon warned his colleagues against the “Jordanian option:” “Gentlemen, we toyed with this idea in 1948-1949 concerning the Hashemite dynasty. Instead of conquering Jerusalem, which was within our grasp, and the entire West Bank, which was a matter of three or four days, we played around with the Hashemite dynasty and paid a heavy price for it. I fear that this is happening again. The last thing we need to do is to return even an inch of the West Bank. We shouldn’t imagine that Hussein will live forever.”

Allon repeatedly criticized King Hussein and doubted the logic of entering into negotiations with him. “Today it’s Hussein, tomorrow it will be Nabulsi, and the day after some Syrian who takes control of them. Then they’ll have a defense pact with the Soviet Union and China, and we’ll find ourselves in a much tougher situation. We are talking about something that isn’t eternity, and people are basing it all on a human individual who may live for 60 years at most, if no-one shoots him in the meantime.”

Allon argued that “Israel must not withdraw to the 1967 borders, because returning to unsafe borders means certain war in the near future.” His conclusion was that the logical solution to Israel’s security problems on its eastern front was the establishment of a Palestinian state on most of the West Bank. “I am talking about the maximum option. Not a canton or an autonomous zone, but an independent Arab state, agreed by us and them, in an enclave surrounded by Israeli territory... The state will even be independent in its foreign policy.”⁸ Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan also opposed negotiations with King Hussein and supported the proposal to consider an arrangement based on the “Palestinian option.” Allon formulated his plan in this spirit and presented it to Prime Minister Eshkol on 26 July 1967.

⁸ Yeruham Cohen, *The Allon Plan* (Bnai Brak: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1973) (in Hebrew); Reuven Pedhazur, *The Victory of Confusion: The Policies of the Eshkol Government in the Territories after the Six Day War* (Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin, 1996) (in Hebrew).

Map 1: Allon Plan, 1967-1968



The Allon Plan was based on the following assumptions:

- A. Peace with the Arab states and the Palestinians is possible and necessary. The time in which the lack of an agreement or a state of hostilities is beneficiary for the two sides has passed.
- B. The geo-strategic completeness of the Land of Israel, which allows for defensible borders and avoidance of future wars, is to be preserved.
- C. Demographically, a Jewish majority is maintained in the State of Israel, a condition that enables the existence of a democratic Jewish state, according to the Zionist vision.
- D. The Palestinian people are given the opportunity to realize an independent national existence, without harming the security of the State of Israel, and the choice of whether to associate itself politically with Jordan or Israel.

The proposed arrangements on the basis of the Green Line:

1. The eastern boundary of the State of Israel will be formed by the Jordan River, followed by a line stretching across the length of the Dead Sea, and its continuation along the Mandatory border along the Arava.
2. A strip of 15 kilometers west of the Jordan River shall be part of the State of Israel. In the Judean Desert area, until the east of Hebron, the width of the strip will reach 25 kilometers and will be used as a link connecting the Negev and the Jordan Valley.
3. There will be a passage between Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip, which will enable a free passage to the Gaza port.
4. The entire area of Jerusalem will be annexed to the State of Israel.
5. With regard to areas densely populated by Arabs in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza area, negotiations between the State of Israel, the residents and the Arab states will take place towards an agreed upon governance structure.⁹

On 22 November 1967 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 242, establishing a diplomatic framework for peace between Israel and the Arab countries under the formula “land for peace.” Against this background, Allon’s second plan – the “Jordanian Option” – enjoyed some success. The plan was presented to the government in February 1968 and was based on the principle of territorial compromise. Israel would continue to hold areas it considered important for security purposes (such as the Jordan Valley), while returning to Arab control areas occupied in the 1967 War that were densely populated by Arabs or that were not required for Israel’s security needs. Allon believed that the Palestinian problem could best be resolved in the form of a Jordanian-Palestinian state. He made various amendments to his plan over the years, though he never published a map showing the proposed borders. The plan was not approved by the governments of Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir, and Yitzhak Rabin (1967-1977), but they adopted it as the basis for their settlement plans.¹⁰ The members of the government empowered Yigal Allon and Abba Eban to present the plan to King Hussein.¹¹ Allon and Eban eventually presented the “Allon Jordanian Plan”¹² at the end of September 1968 at a secret meeting in London. King

⁹ Yigal Allon Centre Website, <http://bet-alon.co.il/eng/alon-plan/>

¹⁰ Pedhazur, *The Victory of Confusion*, 124 ff.; Yigal Allon Centre Website, <http://bet-alon.co.il/eng/alon-plan/>

¹¹ It is worth noting that Menachem Begin was one of the members of this government, and he approved the decision to offer most of the areas of the West Bank to the Jordanian king.

¹² A corridor was added to the planning in the Jericho area linking the West Bank and Jordan.

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Hussein rejected the Israeli proposal, making his famous declaration that “the Allon Plan is totally unacceptable.”¹³

During the period of office of the prime ministers from the Ma’arach (the future Labor Party) – Levy Eshkol, Golda Meir, and Yitzhak Rabin – a total of 22 settlements (kibbutzim and moshavim) were built in the Jordan Valley by the United Kibbutz Movement (TAKAM), the Union of Moshavim, Mishkei Herut Beitar, Ha’oved Hatzioni, the Agricultural Union, and the Moshav Movement. A distinction should be made between the policy of Levy Eshkol, who saw the territories as an additional bargaining chip in negotiations that would end in their return (with the exception of Jerusalem), and the position of Golda Meir, who saw no reason to return the territories that had been conquered. “Drawing maps does not bring peace nearer,” she argued.¹⁴ She declared that Israel was interested in peace, but added that she did not believe in the peace plans that had been put forward. Rabin shared Eshkol’s approach when he came to office, but later preferred gradual agreements: “I prefer interim arrangements, with test periods between each stage, rather than an attempt to move forward in one move to a comprehensive agreement.”¹⁵ He added that “a transition to genuine peace is a process, not a one-time act.”¹⁶

In addition, several settlements were constructed by the founders of Gush Emunim, members of the Religious Kibbutz movement, in the second and third strips of the West Bank (Kfar Etzion, Elazar, Allon Shvut, Rosh Tzurim, Har Gilo, Kiryat Arba, and Ofra). The settlement of Mevo Horon was built in the third strip, while the moshavim Kfar Ruth and Shilat were built in no-man’s land in the Latrun area.

Today there are two regional councils in the eastern strip: Arvot Hayarden and Megillot – Dead Sea, with a joint total population of some 6,800 Israelis in 25 settlements, accounting for 1.6 percent of the Israeli population in Judea and Samaria (excluding East Jerusalem). The settlements in the Jordan Valley are small, located at an average distance of 21 kilometers from each other, lack settlement consolidation, and rely on public services and commercial centers in the cities of Beit Shean, Afula, and Jerusalem, inside the Green Line. Spatial control is also confined to agricultural areas totaling no more than some 80,000 dunams, farmed in practice by approximately 200 Israeli households and thousands of Palestinian laborers from the surrounding communities (see Map 2).

¹³ Reuven Pedhazur, “Israeli Governments are Missing Peace,” *Haaretz*, 30 September 2002.

¹⁴ *Haaretz*, 10 March 1969.

¹⁵ Interview with Yitzhak Rabin, 25 September 1975, *Maariv*.

¹⁶ Interview with Yitzhak Rabin, 26 March 1974, *Maariv*.

Map 2: Jewish Settlements Established through 1977



During the period 2009-2015, the Israeli population in the Jordan Valley increased by around 1,200. It is worth noting that all the national-religious settlements saw population growth, whereas some of the secular settlements (such as Argaman, Hamra, and Naomi) recorded a decline in population. In particular, Ma’ale Ephraim Local Council saw a significant fall of 13 percent.

By contrast, the Greater Jerusalem Triangle is now home to over 400,000 Israelis, representing some 70 percent of all Israelis who live beyond the Green Line. The vast majority of these settlers live in the heart of the Triangle – the Jewish neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, which have a population of over 200,000 – and in the three large Jewish cities that serve as the corners of the Triangle: Modi’in Illit to the northwest (68,372), Ma’ale Adumim to the east (40,828), and Beitar Illit to the southwest (54,921).

The Sharon Plan

Following the dramatic elections of 1977, when the Likud replaced the Ma'arach as the main party of government, Ariel Sharon was appointed Minister of Agriculture in the first government of Menachem Begin. Sharon was also given the position of chairperson of the Ministerial Committee for Settlement.¹⁷ On 26 July 1977, in a meeting lasting just 20 minutes, the Settlement Committee approved the recognition of Allon Moreh, Ma'ale Adumim, and Ofra as legal settlements.¹⁸

On 29 September 1977, Sharon presented his political and settlement plan to the security cabinet, which met for a special discussion on the future of Judea and Samaria.¹⁹ The plan was based on Sharon's longstanding acquaintance with the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and on a working paper entitled *The Double Backbone*.²⁰ Sharon believed that his plan met the main problems facing the State of Israel on its eastern border. The Sharon Plan included elements that had been included in the Allon Plan,²¹ some of which had already been implemented, as well as elements of Moshe Dayan's "Fists Plan."²² A new component related to the western section of the West Bank, providing for a western "security zone" along the Green Line.²³

¹⁷ A joint committee of the Israeli government and the World Zionist Organization empowered by the Israeli government to approve the establishment of settlements. The committee was established in 1970 on the basis of an equal number of members from the government and the WZO. Government Resolution 803 dated 27 July 1977 established that "the government again empowers the joint Settlement Committee with the Zionist Executive to decide on the establishment of new settlements."

¹⁸ Nir Hefetz and Gadi Blum, *The Shepherd* (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 2005) (in Hebrew), p. 313.

¹⁹ Sharon concluded his presentation of the plan to the government in the following words: "I am the only Mapainik in this government. I am not speak here so that my words can be recorded in the minutes. Consider the matter carefully. Once it is approved, I am going to do it." See: Akiva Eldar and Idit Zertal, *Masters of the Land* (Or Yehuda: Kinneret Zamora-Beitan Dvir) (in Hebrew), p. 84.

²⁰ On 23 September 1977, a few days before Sharon presented his plan, the journalist Aharon Bechar revealed in *Yediot Acharonot* that the plan was largely based on a working paper known as "The Double Backbone," submitted by the architect Avraham Wachman to the then-Prime Minister Rabin in January 1976. Rabin rejected the paper. Hefetz and Blum, *The Shepherd*, 314.

²¹ Sharon stated that he opposed the Allon Plan, among other reasons, because it lengthened Israel's borders by 400 kilometers, creating difficulties in defense. Yeshayahu Pullman, *The Story of the Separation Fence: Disregard for Life?* (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2004) (in Hebrew), 33.

²² The "Fists Plan," conceived by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan in 1968, focused on the security need to control the central mountain ridge, which is densely populated by Palestinians. Dayan proposed installing a "fist" consisting of a military base, a town, and agricultural settlements, alongside each of the five main Palestinian cities in the West

The settlements due to be established in Western Samaria were intended to prevent the Palestinian population from seeping into Israel; to create a Jewish barrier between Israeli Arabs in Wadi Ara and the “Small Triangle” area; and to control key hilltops overlooking the coastal plain, which is home to 70 percent of Israel’s population and 80 percent of its industrial capacity, as well as protecting the airfields in central Israel, particularly Ben Gurion Airport.²⁴

A component that was included in the Allon Plan, but was only implemented on a significant scale after 1977, was the strengthening of the area around Jerusalem and the separation of the northern and southern halves of the West Bank. This was to be achieved by building a belt of Jewish neighborhoods and settlements around Arab East Jerusalem, from Gush Etzion and Efrat in the south, through Ma’ale Adumim (as far as the Inn of the Good Samaritan) in the east, and on to Bet El and Ofra in the north. Later, when Sharon served as prime minister, this area came to be known as the “Jerusalem Envelope.”

A further component was the construction of latitudinal roads connecting the western and eastern security zones. These were particularly important in order to facilitate the eastwards movement of forces in an emergency. The roads were to be secured by establishing Jewish settlements along their course.²⁵


Bank, which formed the political and economic centers of the area: Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Hebron. The goal was to facilitate an immediate response to disturbances and terror acts, and in the event of a broader security threat – to dissect the West Bank into several areas (all the “fists” are situated along Route 60, which crosses the West Bank from north to south). The plan was rejected by the government of Levi Eshkol. Arieli, 2013.

²³ Yigal Allon had also discussed the possibility of border adjustments in this area for security reasons, though he totally rejected the idea: “In strategic terms, I do not consider the border adjustments along the Western line to have strategic importance.” Levi Eshkol took a similar approach: “I cannot see any border adjustment in this part that interests us [...] from the direction of Qalqiliya, Tel Aviv, or Tulkarem. It seems to me that such an adjustment will only cause damage.” Reuven Pedhazur, “What are Defendable Borders?” *Haaretz*, 6 June 2011.

²⁴ Shimon Peres, who like Sharon and unlike Allon favored the integrated approach, also attached considerable importance to this component. He argued that “settlement on the Western slopes of the Samarian Hills will save us from the curse of Israel’s narrow waist...” Shimon Peres, *Tomorrow is Now* (Jerusalem: Mabat, 1978) (in Hebrew).

²⁵ Government Resolution 262, dated 3 January 1978, stated in part: “...to approve the construction of the roads in Judea and Samaria as proposed by the Minister of Agriculture and in accordance with the map brought to the government’s attention (the map is available at the Government Secretariat.)”

Map 3: The Sharon Plan for the Settlement Zones²⁶



²⁶ Source: Survey of Israel, special edition in English.

Sharon preferred urban settlements, since these were easier to establish and populate, in contrast to the agricultural settlements that characterized the Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley, Gush Etzion, and the Gaza Strip – areas where settlement was inspired by the Allon Plan, which was motivated in part by a desire to preserve the traditions of Labor Zionism. There were two main reasons for Sharon's preference: firstly, and most importantly, the Supreme Court ruling in the Allon Moreh case,²⁷ which prevented the possibility of Israel seizing privately-owned Palestinian land by military order in order to establish settlements on security grounds; and secondly – the shortage of water sources for the development of agricultural settlements.

A further component in Sharon's plan was to complete the chain of Jewish settlements established under the Allon Plan along the Jordan River, from Beit Shean to the Dead Sea. The objective was to create a security buffer on Israel's eastern front and a demographic buffer in areas that had been denuded of their Palestinian residents between the Palestinians in the West Bank and their compatriots on the eastern side of the River Jordan.

Allon and Rabin saw the contiguity of the dense Palestinian population along the mountain ridge and the Green Line as a component that should not be harmed, and indeed should be maintained ahead of a permanent agreement. By contrast, Sharon overtly sought to weaken and divide this band of Palestinian settlement in order to enhance Israel's security control of the West Bank. The government approved the Sharon Plan on 2 October 1977, and it was presented to the Knesset on 9 November of the same year.

The Sharon Plan also reflected and complemented the political approach of Prime Minister Menachem Begin. On 28 December 1977 Begin presented his autonomy plan, based on the following key points: In Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, an autonomous administration would be established for and by the Arab residents.

²⁷ HCJ 390/70 *'Izzat Muhammad Mustafa Dweikat and 16 Others v Government of Israel et al., Piske Din 39(1)*. This was a petition by Palestinian residents whose land was seized in order to establish the settlement of Allon Moreh, and was the only time that the Court accepted the argument that the claim of "security needs" cannot stand, since factually the decision to establish the settlements was political and ideological, and not based on security. This was the only time that the Supreme Court agreed to discuss the legality of the settlements. The ruling marked a reversal of the Court's earlier position on the confiscation of land. It ordered the eviction of the settlement and the return of the land to its owners, after the settlers themselves had declined to argue that the settlement had any security purpose, instead claiming divine right. Justice Landau remarked: "This petition contains a decisive answer to an argument that seeks to interpret the historical right granted to the Jewish people in the Book of Books as damaging property rights in accordance with private property laws."

They would elect an administrative council to be based in Bethlehem that would be responsible for administrative aspects relating to the Arab residents of the territories. The Israeli authorities would continue to be responsible for security and public order. Regardless of their citizenship (or lack thereof), the residents of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip would be given a free choice to acquire Israeli or Jordanian citizenship. Israeli residents would be free to purchase land and settle in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. Arabs in these areas who chose freely to become Israeli citizens would be entitled to purchase land and settle in Israel. Israel insisted on its right and claim to sovereignty over Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip.²⁸

The vast majority of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank were built in accordance with the Sharon Plan. Some 88 settlements were built between 1977 and 1993, when Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo Agreement. The number of Israelis in the Judea and Samaria District rose from 6,000 in 1977 to 109,000 in 1993.

However, the Sharon Plan failed to secure its political objective of creating conditions that would permit the annexation of Israeli “security zones” by means of a shift in the demographic balance and in spatial control. As Map 4 shows, the “Eastern Security Zone,” extending from the River Jordan to the eastern slopes of the Samarian Hills and the Judean Desert, includes 45 Jewish settlements and 249 Arab communities. Palestinians constitute a majority of 93 percent of the population.

A similar situation can be seen in the “Western Security Zone,” which includes the western slopes of the Samarian Hills and a small area on the western slopes of the Judean Hills. This area includes 34 Jewish settlements and 163 Arab communities, with an Arab majority of 82.3 percent of the population. The situation in the Jerusalem Envelope is different, but not to an extent that could justify an Israeli claim to annex the entire area on demographic or spatial grounds. This area includes 30 Jewish settlements (12 of which are Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem), compared to 96 Arab communities (including the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem). The demographic situation is relatively balanced, with Arabs accounting for 46.5 percent of the population.

The proportion of Jewish-owned land compared to Palestinian-owned land in all these areas is very small. The potential for Jewish settlement relies mainly on regulated and declared state land.

²⁸ Knesset website, <http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/autonomy1977.htm>

Map 4: The Settlement Areas in the Sharon Plan




Table 1: Land Ownership in the Settlement Areas according to the Sharon Plan²⁹

Settlement / security area	Regulated state land (sq. km.)	Declared state land (sq. km.)	Jewish-owned land (sq. km.)	Survey land (sq. km.)	Palestinian-owned land (sq. km.)	Israeli built-up area (sq. km.)	Palestinian built-up area (sq. km.)
Mountain ridge	62.85	363.88	1.77	140.47	409.379	7.02	170.97
Jordan Valley	522.608	319.96	2.77	426.9	596.15	15.01	99.65
West Judea and Samaria	35.68	116.07	0.18	64.94	375.68	18.61	78.96
Jerusalem Envelope	12.39	44.87	5.77	33.44	159.38	29.83	46.34

²⁹ Source: based on information layers from the Civil Administration, 2014.

The Drobles Plan

Drobles presented his plan to the Likud government in 1979, explaining that “for some time there has been a noticeable lack of a comprehensive, well-grounded and professional plan for settlement in Judea and Samaria.” He believed that there was a need “to search for various possibilities to consolidate a general master plan in Judea and Samaria that will be implemented, in the first stage, over five years. This examination will center on a comprehensive and system-based land survey...”

Map 5: The Drobles Plan (1979)




Table 2: Blocs in the Drobles Plan

No.	Name of Bloc	Size in sq. km.
1	Mount Hebron Slopes	256.40
2	Yatir Bloc	101.38
3	Judean Desert Area	278.32
4	Northern Dead Sea Area	171.94
5	Gush Etzion	135.41
6	Ma'ale Adumim Bloc	136.07
7	Givon Bloc	37.51
8	Modi'im Bloc	61.67
9	Bet El Bloc	80.45
10	Halamish Bloc	58.01
11	Shilo Bloc	48.97
12	Ariel Bloc	60.64
13	Karnei Shomron Bloc	59.84
14	Allon Moreh Bloc	43.51
15	Kedumim Bloc	30.32
16	Salit Bloc	17.01
17	Tirtzeh Bloc	26.52
18	Shavei Shomron Bloc	41.11
19	Western Bloc	47.81
20	Reihan Bloc	76.32
21	Northern Samaria Bloc	342.80
22	Jordan Valley Bloc	702.20

Drobles proposed the following principles:

1. "Settlement throughout Israel is intended for security purposes and is implemented by right. A strip of settlements in strategic sites enhances both domestic and external security, and in addition realizes our right to the Land of Israel.
2. The proposed deployment of settlements will be implemented in accordance with the settlement policy of blocs of settlements in areas of homogenous settlement with mutual connections. In time, this will permit the establishment of joint services and means of development. Moreover, as the settlements expand and develop, some of them may even, over the course of time, integrate into an urban settlement that may include all the settlements in that bloc. In just four cases, there was no alternative but to propose the establishment of an isolated settlement, due to territorial and topographical limitations at the site.

3. The deployment of the settlements must be undertaken not only around minority settlements, but also among them, in accordance with the settlement policy adopted in the Galilee and other areas of the country. Over time, with or without peace, we will need to learn to live with and among the minorities, while we maintain good neighborly relations with them, and they with us. It will be best for both peoples, Jews and Arabs, if they can learn to do this as soon as possible, since ultimately the development and flourishing of the area will be to the benefit of all its residents. Accordingly, the proposed settlement blocs are positioned as a strip surrounding the mountain ridge in Judea and Samaria, beginning from the western slopes, from north to south, and along the eastern slopes, from north to south: both among and around the minority population.
4. New settlements will be established solely on state-owned land, and not on properly registered private Arab land. We will ensure that there is no need to confiscate private plots from minorities. This is the main and unusual innovation in this master plan: all the areas proposed below as sites for the establishment of new settlements have been scrupulously examined, their location has been determined in a precise manner, and all without a shadow of doubt are state owned – on the basis of the preliminary findings of the basic and comprehensive land survey that is currently being conducted.
5. The location of the settlements will be determined after a thorough examination of the various sites, with attention to their suitability for settlement, topographical conditions, possibilities for preparing the ground, and so forth.
6. In order to create as broad a super zone as possible, and to establish settlements that will have a high quality of life, we propose that most of the settlements in Judea and Samaria be established initially as community settlements. In addition to these, a number of agricultural and mixed settlements will be established in locations that have appropriate means of production. Settler employment will mainly be in industry, tourism, and services, with a minority engaged in intensive agriculture.”

Drobes concluded by noting: “As if well known, it is the task of the Land Settlement Division to initiate, plan, and execute the settlement enterprise in accordance with

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the decision of the government and the decisions of the Joint Settlements Committee of the government and the World Zionist Organization.”³⁰

The plan calls for the “construction of 46 new settlements in Judea and Samaria over five years, at the end of which they will be inhabited by 16,000 families, at an investment of 32 billion Israeli pounds.”³¹ In addition, “taking into account the densification of the new settlements and those under construction, an addition of 11,000 families is proposed by the end of five years, at an investment of 22 billion Israeli pounds.” Combining these two figures: “After five years, 27,000 families will be added in Judea and Samaria, in the proposed settlements, existing settlements, and those under construction; this will require a total investment of 54 billion Israeli pounds.”

Thus Drobles’ textual proposal referred to the construction of 46 new settlements. However, a more careful examination of the attached maps reveals 70 new settlements: 64 within the West Bank, and the remainder inside the Green Line.

In practice, by 1985 – the target year of the plan – a total of 13 settlements were constructed in the West Bank, as well as four within the Green Line, comprising just 21 percent of the plan objectives.

Table 3: Settlements in the Drobles Plan Proposed and Implemented in the West Bank through 1985

No.	Proposed Name	Actual Name
1	Reihan B	Shaked
2	Allon Moreh B	Itamar
3	Allon Moreh C	Itamar
4	Karnei Shomron C	Alfei Menashe
5	Karnei Shomron E	Immanuel
6	Elkana B	Kiryat Netafim
7	Shilo C	Ma’ale Levona
8	Givon B	Givat Ze’ev
9	Givon C	Givat Ze’ev
10	To be decided	Beitar Illit
11	Lucifer	Metzadot Yehuda
12	Susiya	Susiya
13	Ne’ima A	Na’omi

³⁰ Matityahu Drobles, *Master Plan for Settlement in Judea and Samaria, 1979-1983* (Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, Settlement Division, 1979) (in Hebrew).

³¹ One Israeli pound in 1978 values is equivalent to approximately NIS 0.73 (US\$0.20) today.

Table 4: Settlements Constructed through 1985 that Were Not Proposed

No.	Name
1	Gannim
2	Kadim
3	Sa-Nur
4	Yakir
5	Sha'arei Tikva
6	Barkan (Beit Abba)
7	Eli
8	Beit Aryeh
9	Hashmonaim
10	Ma'ale Mikhmas
11	Kedar
12	Nokdim
13	Neve Daniel
14	Ma'ale Amos
15	Asfar (Metzad)
16	Pnei Hever
17	Tene
18	Eshkolot


Table 5: Settlements Constructed within the Green Line

No.	Name
1	Katzir
2	Harish
3	Shekef
4	Shomriya


Table 6: Settlements Proposed and Constructed in the West Bank through 2016

No.	Proposed Name	Actual Name
1	West D	Avnei Hefetz
2	Matityahu B	Modi'in Illit
3	Roi C	Maskiyyot
4	Yatir B	Shani-Livne


Map 6: Implementation of the Drobles Plan: Northern West Bank



Map 7: Implementation of the Drobles Plan: Central West Bank



Map 8: Implementation of the Drobles Plan: Southern West Bank



Regarding the planned additional population of 44,000, it is impossible to provide a precise picture in the absence of full data for 1985. However, on the basis of partial data, the actual population increase seems to range from just 5 percent to 40 percent in the various blocs, with the exception of Ma'ale Adumim.

Table 7: Population Targets in the Drobles Plan versus Implementation

Name of Bloc	Actual population, 1983	Target population³²	Actual population, 1985	Total population, 2016
Hebron Mountain slopes	313	1,252	**	2,517
Allon Moreh	451	1,804	**	5,196
Ariel	1,568	6,272	**	37,815
Beit El	1,674	6,696	**	2,971
Jordan Valley	3,196	12,784	**	7,695
Givon	282	1,128	**	20,820
Gush Etzion	2,567	10,268	**	83,113
Halamish	611	2,444	920	6,305
Yatir Bloc	96	384	**	2,154
Judean Desert	0	0	**	987
Modi'im Bloc	360	1,440	**	81,810
Ma'ale Adumim	846	3,384	10,026	50,487
Salit Bloc	234	936	**	862
Northern Dead Sea	172	688	**	760
Kedumim	811	3,244	1110	4,574
Karnei Shomron	1,009	4,036	4516	24,070
Reihan Bloc	349	1,396	**	2,854
Shavei Shomron	267	1,068	341	991
Shilo	325	1,300	447	8,550
Northern Samaria	53	212	**	0
West	0	0	0	0
Tirtzeh	0	0	0	0

³² Calculated by multiplying the proposed number of families by four.

The Super Zones Plan

In 1993, the Israeli government, headed by Yitzhak Rabin from the Labor Party, signed the Declaration of Principles with the PLO. Under the terms of the Interim Accords (1994-1998),³³ Israel transferred powers to the Palestinian Authority in Areas A and B, which today account for approximately 40 percent of the total area of the West Bank. The subject of the Jewish settlements was left for the discussions of the permanent agreement, and no Jewish settlements were evacuated during the interim period under the terms of the agreement.

In 1996 Benjamin Netanyahu was elected prime minister, one year after summarizing his political position in the following terms: “The plan for autonomy under Israeli control is the only alternative for preventing the dangers inherent in the ‘peace’ plan of the Oslo Accord.”³⁴

A year after Netanyahu came to power, the Settlement Division published its “Super Zones” plan, intended for implementation by the year 2000.³⁵ The main goal of the plan was “to present the possibilities and modalities for maintaining settlement super zones between adjacent settlements in order to facilitate the functioning of the settlements and strengthen their socioeconomic fabric.”

The plan presented the following overview of the settlement enterprise: “129 existing settlements (including five Nachal [=militarized] settlement outposts), as well as an additional 46 sites proposed for settlement and 90 existing and proposed employment sites adjacent to the settlements.” These were organized in 31 “blocs” and had a total population of approximately 150,000 Israelis in 1997. The “super zones” covered a total area of some 3.1 million dunams (approximately 50 percent of the territory of the West Bank), including two million dunams of state land and 1.1 million dunams of land under private Arab ownership.

The Settlement Division distinguished between three types of settlement “super zones:”

- A. **Blocs of settlements** enable territorial contiguity, without a significant Arab population. This category included 20 blocs, containing 104 settlements and Nachal outposts, as well as 35 additional sites proposed for settlement, with a total population of 109,000 Israelis.


³³ Gaza and Jericho Agreement 1994, Interim Agreement 1995, Hebron Protocol 1997, Wye Memorandum 1998.

³⁴ Benjamin Netanyahu, *A Place among the Nations* (New York: Bantam, 1993)

³⁵ World Zionist Organization, Settlement Division, *Settlement Systems in Judea and Samaria, 1997 Update* (June 1997) (in Hebrew).

- B. **Settlement clusters** including several adjacent settlements, but without territorial contiguity. This category included five clusters containing 12 existing settlements and seven sites proposed for settlement, with a total population of approximately 14,000 Israelis.
- C. **Other settlements** – in most cases, these are adjacent to communities within the Green Line and maintain their principal affinity with these communities. This category included 13 settlements, as well as four sites proposed for settlement, with a total population of 22,000 Israelis.

Map 9: The Settlement Division’s “Super Zones” Plan



The plan related to four “super zones” and one “buffer zone.” When combined, these once again created areas of settlement similar to those in the Sharon Plan.

- A. The **Northern Samaria buffer zone**, with an area of 215.5 sq. km. (3.7 percent of the area of the West Bank), had a population at the time of 1,700 Jews and approximately 36,000 Arabs. Six settlements were planned in this area, in addition to seven existing settlements, thereby increasing the number of Israeli residents by 154 percent.
- B. The **Jordan Valley super zone**, with an area of 1,534 sq. km., had a population of 5,500 Jews and a similar number of Arabs. The plan called for three new settlements, in addition to the 28 existing settlements, doubling the number of Israeli residents.
- C. The **Southern Hebron Mountain super zone**, with an area of 386.5 sq. km., had a population of 2,500 Israelis and 11,000 Arabs. The plan called for just one new settlement in this area, alongside nine existing settlements, with an increase of 75 percent in the number of Israeli residents.
- D. The **Jerusalem Belt super zone**, with an area of 676 sq. km., had a population of 65,000 Israelis and 83,000 Arabs (excluding Jerusalem). The plan proposed seven new settlements in this area, alongside 35 existing settlements, with an increase of 80 percent in the number of Israeli residents.
- E. The **Western Samaria super zone**, with an area of 671.7 sq. km., had a population of 60,000 Israelis and 108,000 Arabs. The plan sought to add 13 new settlements to the existing 35 settlements, with an increase of 80 percent in the number of Israeli residents.

In addition to the super zones, the plan also defined three strategic corridors crossing Judea and Samaria from west to east, and facilitating transportation links between the coastal plain and the Jordan Valley:

- A. The **Trans-Samaria Corridor**: Rosh Ha’ayin – Petza’el (route 5 and Route 505).
- B. The **Modi’in-Jerusalem-Mevo’ot Adumim Corridor**: Ben Shemen – Beit Horon – Jerusalem – Mevo’ot Yeriho (planned Route 45, Route 1, and northern Dead Sea).
- C. The **Gush Etzion Corridor**: Ha’ela Valley – Gush Etzion – Mitzpe Shalem (Route 367 and planned Route 369).

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Two strategic longitudinal routes were also defined:

- A. **Route 60:** the road along the mountain ridge from Northern Samaria through Jerusalem to the Southern Hebron Mountain.
- B. **Route 80:** the road due to connect the Arad area through Mishor Adumim and north to the Gilboa along the edge of the desert.

Lastly, the plan defined six latitudinal routes serving as “life arteries” for the Jewish settlements:


- A. **Northern Trans-Samaria**, serving mainly the settlements of Mevo Dotan, Hermesh, Sa-Nur, and Homesh.
- B. **Tulkarem bypass – Shavei Shomron – Adam Bridge**, serving Shavei Shomron, Avnei Hefetz, Homesh, and Sa-Nur.
- C. **Rantis intersection – Ofarim – Route 60**, serving mainly Alei Zahav, Paduel, Beit Aryeh, Ofarim, Halamish, Ateret, and Nahaliel.
- D. **Nili – Dolev – Beit El**, serving mainly as an artery for the settlements of Nahaliel, Talmon, Dolev, Na’ale, and Nili.
- E. **Trans-Judea**, serving mainly as an artery for the settlements of: Telem, Adora, Kiryat Arba, Pnei Hever, and Beit Hagai.
- F. **Shim’a – Susiya**, serving mainly as an artery for the settlements of: Carmel, Maon, Susiya, Metzadot Yehuda, Livne, Shim’a, and Otniel.

Three of the recommendations presented in the plan were particularly significant:

- A. “To attach state land, nature reserves, national parks, and archeological sites adjacent to the communities to the contract and land allocation system of those communities, as part of the settlement zone concept.”
- B. “To attach private Arab land situated within the relevant super zones to the area of jurisdiction of the local authority, and/or to define it as a military zone, without harming the existing ownership rights.”
- C. “To include infrastructures (roads, water lines, electricity, sewage, etc.) and relevant installations within the settlement super zones, and to take the necessary statutory steps for the future implementation of planned infrastructures vital for the functioning of the super zones.”


In the plan's target year, 2000, the Northern Buffer Zone included the same seven settlements with the same number of residents as before the plan. By 2016, the number of settlements had been reduced to five, due to the implementation of the Disengagement Plan in Northern Samaria in 2005, which entailed the evacuation of the settlements of Gannim and Kadim to the east of Jenin. The number of residents rose by 2014, but was still 17 percent below the target for the year 2000. The number of Palestinians rose to 42,758 by 2016 (growth of 19 percent). The number of Israelis as a proportion of the total population of the super zone rose from 4.5 percent to 6.8 percent.

Map 10: Northern Buffer Zone (2016)




In the Jordan Valley super zone, the number of settlements fell to 27 (following the dismantling of the Nachal outpost Elisha), and the number of settlers also fell in absolute terms by 4.5 percent by the year 2000. By 2016 the number of residents was higher than in 2000, but was still 14 percent below the target for the year 2000. The number of Palestinians rose to 28,906 by 2016, excluding the city of Jericho. The proportion of Israelis in this super zone fell from 50 percent to 22.6 percent.

Map 11: The Jordan Valley Super Zone (2016)



In the Southern Hebron Mountain, the number of settlements remained unchanged, while the number of residents was 35 percent below the target for the year 2000. By 2016 the number of residents was 34 percent higher than the planned number of 2000. The number of Palestinian residents rose to 12,405 by 2015 (growth of 10.4 percent). The proportion of Israelis in this “super zone” increased from 18.5 percent to 31.5 percent.

Map 12: Southern Hebron Mountain Super Zone (2016)



In the Jerusalem Envelope the number of settlements was unchanged as of the year 2000, and the number of residents was 27 percent below the target for the year 2000, though by 2016 the number was 65 percent above this target. The number of Palestinians rose to 110,983 by 2016 (growth of 34.3 percent). The proportion of Israelis in this super zone rose from 43.9 percent to 79.4 percent, thus reflecting the achievement of a Jewish majority.

Map 13: Jerusalem Envelope (2016)




Table 8: Land Ownership and Built-Up Areas in the Super Zones

“Super Zone”	Regulated state land (sq. km.)	Declared state land (sq. km.)	Jewish-owned land (sq. km.)	Survey land (sq. km.)	Palestinian-owned land (sq. km.)	Israeli built-up area (sq. km.)	Palestinian built-up area (sq. km.)
Jordan Valley	476.69	416.95	1.24	282.8	330.66	5.7	12.64
Northern Samaria Buffer Zone	41.13	7.52	/	1.78	110.64	1.21	11.98
Southern Hebron Mountain	0.94	135.61	/	105.7	89.08	1.81	7.85
Jerusalem Envelope	61.56	93.37	6.3	98.94	311.55	20.85	33.75
West Samaria	1.2	118.34	1.66	56.05	340.68	22.39	30.15


In Western Samaria the number of settlements in 2000 remained unchanged, while the number of Israeli residents was 27 percent below the target figure. By 2016 the number of residents was 69 percent above the 2000 target. Meanwhile, the number of Palestinians rose to 225,991 by 2016 (growth of 110 percent). The proportion of Israelis in this super zone rose from 35.7 percent to 44.6 percent.

To summarize the results of this plan, as of the year 2000, not a single settlement was added in any of the super zones. The total number of additional settlers was 72,090, compared to the planned figure of 114,463. During the same period, the number of Palestinians in the super zone areas rose by 180,209 by 2016.

The Trans-Samaria Corridor was widened to four lanes as far as Ariel, but continues to have just two lanes from Ariel to Petza’el.

In the Modi’in-Jerusalem Corridor, the planned Route 45 was not constructed, with the exception of the section between Givat Ze’ev and Atarot. However, Route 443 was widened to four lanes up to this section, as was Route 1 from Jerusalem east as far as Jericho intersection.

Map 14: Western Samaria Buffer Zone (2016)



In the Gush Etzion Corridor, Route 369 was not constructed and Route 367 continued to have just two lanes. On the longitudinal highway Route 60, no new sections were constructed apart from those built during the implementation of the interim agreement (Ramallah bypass, Bethlehem bypass, and Hebron bypass).

Route 80 was not constructed in the section from Mishor Adumim south to Arad Valley. The six latitudinal routes were maintained.

Table 9: Rate of Implementation of the “Super Zones” Plan

Name of Super Zone	No. of settlements in plan		Actual no. of settlements		Gap existing/ planned, 2000	Gap existing/ planned, 2016	Population in plan		Actual population, 2000	Gap existing/ planned, 2000		Actual population, 2016	Gap existing/ proposed, 2016	
	Existing (1997)	Proposed 2000	2000	2014			Existing (1997)	Proposed		No.	%		No.	%
Northern Samaria Buffer Zone	7	13	7	5	-6	-8	1,689	4,295	1,687	-2,608	-60.7%	3,134	-1,161	-27.0%
Jordan Valley	28	31	28	27	-3	-4	5,465	11,189	5,271	-5,918	-52.9%	8,455	-2,734	-24.4%
Southern Hebron Mountain	9	10	9	9	-1	-1	2,427	4,254	2,765	-1,489	-35.0%	5,699	1,445	34.0%
Jerusalem Envelope	35	42	34	34	-8	-8	64,312	120,594	87,585	-33,009	-27.4%	199,104	78,510	65.1%
Western Samaria	35	48	35	36	-13	-12	59,546	107,570	78,504	-29,066	-27.0%	181,647	74,077	68.9%

Overview of Israeli Settlement in the West Bank as of 2016


Population

As of 2016, the West Bank includes a total of 138 settlements (including 12 Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem), as well as 103 unauthorized outposts (33 of which are in the process of being approved and converted into legal settlements in accordance with Israeli law). According to statistics from the Civil Administration and the Ministry of Interior, these settlements and neighborhoods have a total population of 640,000 Israelis. The Palestinian population now numbers 2,940,000 people in 792 communities (including East Jerusalem). The Jewish population thus constitutes approximately 18 percent of the total population in the West Bank. If East Jerusalem is excluded, the number of Israelis in the Judea and Samaria District falls to 420,000, representing 12 percent of the total population.


Forty percent of the area of the West Bank is under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. Eighteen percent of the West Bank has the status of Area A, inhabited by 1.5 million Palestinians, while 22 percent has the status of Area B and is inhabited by 1.1 million Palestinians.³⁶ The remaining 60 percent of the West Bank has the status of Area C and is home to some 420,000 Jews and 300,000 Palestinians. A total of 52 percent of Area C are areas restricted by military order: 53 percent of these areas are military firing zones and 29 percent are the jurisdictional areas of Israeli settlements (see Map 16, on which the closed zones are colored blue).

³⁶ Estimates of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) for 2016. *PCBS Website*: <http://www.pcbs.gov.ps>.

Map 15: Jewish Settlements in the West Bank



Map 16: Areas A, B, and C and Restricted Areas³⁷




As Map 17 shows, 88 percent of the Jewish settlements have a small population.


As Map 18 shows, if we include only settlements with a population of over 1,000, then almost all of Northern Samaria, the Jordan Valley, the Judean Desert, and the area south of Gush Etzion is left without Jewish settlement. Map 19, which shows only Jewish settlements with a population of over 5,000, highlights the complete absence of any hierarchy in the pattern of Jewish settlements. All the major settlements are concentrated along the Green Line or adjacent to Jerusalem, with two exceptions, Kiryat Arba and Ariel. None of these four settlements serve as a center of employment, commerce or services for the surrounding smaller settlements. The fabric of life of all the other major settlements faces westward into Israel and Jerusalem, and they do not serve any regional or “bloc” role.

³⁷ Source: Etkes, *Kerem Navot* (updated 2015).


Map 17: Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria by Population Size, 2016



Map 18: Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria with over 1,000 Residents as of 2016




Map 19: Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria with over 5,000 Residents as of 2016



The fact that the number of residents in most of the Jewish settlements is small is a feature that reappears consistently in an analysis of the demographic balance between Jews and Arabs in all the districts of the West Bank. As Map 20 and Table 10 show, with the exception of Western Samaria, which is adjacent to the Green Line, and of the Jerusalem area, the Israeli presence is negligible in both demographic and spatial terms.

Map 20: Distribution of the Israeli and Palestinian Population in the West Bank³⁸



³⁸ Source: Dan Rothem.

Table 10: Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria with over 5,000 Inhabitants in 2016


District	Israelis	Palestinians	Total	% Isr.	% Pal.
Bethlehem	72,538	221,802	294,340	25%	75%
Hebron	31,186	729,194	760,380	4%	96%
Jenin	2,854	318,958	321,812	1%	99%
Jericho	7,158	53,562	60,720	12%	88%
Jerusalem	87,208	161,596*	248,804	35%	65%
Nablus	12,657	389,329	401,986	3%	97%
Qalqiliya	24,329	113,574	137,903	18%	82%
Ramallah	120,131	357,969	478,100	25%	75%
Salfit	56,774	72,279	129,053	44%	56%
Tubas	2,198	66,854	69,052	3%	97%
Tubas	3,866	185,314	189,180	2%	98%
Total	420,899	2,670,431	3,091,330	14%	86%

* Excluding East Jerusalem

In recent decades, the Israeli settlement enterprise in the West Bank has changed its character and has become one driven, budgeted, and promoted by a single sector in Israel: the National-Religious sector. Nevertheless, CBS figures for Israeli settlement in the period 1996-2016 show that actual demographic growth has been dominated by the Haredi sector, which does not share the nationalist and messianic aspirations of the National-Religious community.


Firstly: during this period, a decline was seen in the average annual scope of construction of new residential housing units. The decline to figures below those for any of the preceding 20 years continued until 2016, when an increase was recorded in building starts (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Building Starts in Judea and Samaria, Average No. of Housing Units a Year, according to the Government



Secondly: During this period, average annual growth was higher than the average in Israel (1.9%), but shows a constant and ongoing decline, as Figure 2 shows.

Figure 2: Annual Increase of the Jewish Population in Judea and Samaria, 1995-2016




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In 1995, annual growth was 10.2 percent, while in 2016 it was just 3.9 percent, following a constant downward trend over the intervening period.

Thirdly: in 1996, most of the growth was due to migration, at around 6,000 a year, while natural growth contributed approximately 3,000 a year. In 2015 (the last year for which figures are available), this trend has been reversed: migration contributed only 3,400 people to growth, whereas natural growth was around 12,000.

Figure 3: Sources of Jewish Population Growth in Judea and Samaria, 1995-2015



Fourthly: the growth in the number of Israelis in the West Bank is increasingly based on growth in the two Haredi cities, Modi'in Illit and Beitar Illit, both of which are situated on the Green Line. The vast majority of the residents of these cities see themselves as "settlers against their own will." Cheap housing over the Green Line, **but very close to it**, enables them to overcome the housing crisis that afflicts this sector. This conclusion is supported by the fact that two additional Haredi settlements – Emmanuel (a local council) and Tel Zion (in Mateh Binyamin regional council) – have failed to attract significant numbers of Haredim due to their remote location from the Green Line. In contrast to the exceptionally high rate of natural growth in the Haredi settlements, the low rate of growth in secular communities and the dramatic decline in migration mean that the overall growth rate in the two secular cities – Ma'ale Adumim and Ariel – is lower than the average annual growth rate in Israel as a whole.

Table 11: Jewish Population Growth in Judea and Samaria: Beitar Illit and Modi'in Illit compared to the Other Settlements

Year	Beitar Illit	Modi'in Illit	Other settlements	Total, Judea & Samaria District	Two cities as % of total	Growth in two cities as % of total growth
1996	7,500	6,100	129,100	142,700	9.5%	40.8%
1997	9,800	8,100	136,500	154,400	11.6%	36.8%
1998	11,300	10,500	144,300	166,100	13.1%	33.3%
1999	12,700	13,000	151,800	177,500	14.5%	34.2%
2000	15,800	16,400	159,400	191,600	16.8%	46.1%
2001	17,300	19,200	164,800	201,300	18.1%	44.3%
2002	20,200	22,000	170,700	212,900	19.8%	49.1%
2003	22,930	24,290	179,080	226,300	20.9%	37.5%
2004	24,900	27,390	183,410	235,700	22.2%	53.9%
2005	27,000	30,480	189,820	247,300	23.2%	44.7%
2006	29,130	34,480	197,990	261,600	24.3%	42.9%
2007	32,180	38,050	205,870	276,100	25.4%	45.7%
2008	32,920	40,860	210,320	284,100	26.0%	44.4%
2009	34,900	46,100	215,700	296,700	27.3%	57.3%
2010	37,530	48,590	224,980	311,100	27.7%	35.6%
2011	39,740	51,830	227,130	318,700	28.7%	71.7%
2012	42,470	55,490	243,440	341,400	28.7%	28.1%
2013	44,930	60,050	251,520	356,500	29.4%	46.5%
2014	46,870	63,190	260,640	370,700	29.7%	35.8%
2015	49,340	64,180	272,380	385,900	29.4%	22.8%

Fifthly: growth in the number of residents is mainly in settlements identified with the National-Religious stream. Some of these settlements saw significant growth in 2016: Maskiyyot (20.9%), Sansana (17.4%), Rehelim (16.6%), and Bruchin (16.4%). Many other settlements in this sector did not show significant growth, and some even recorded a decline: Beit El (-0.2%), Psagot (-1.6%), and Allon Shvut (-2.2%).

Sixthly: the secular settlements in the Jordan Valley and Northern Dead Sea area are the lowest priority in the allocation of resources. The increase in the number of Israelis in these areas is below the growth rate within the Green Line, as noted above, and some settlements have seen a decline in the number of residents.


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Seventhly: in 2015, the number of new arrivals to 44 Jewish settlements (35 percent of the total number of settlements) was lower than the number of residents leaving, as can be seen in Table 12 and Map 21.

Table 12: Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria with a Negative Migration Balance, 2015

Settlement	Arrivals	Departures	Balance	Settlement	Arrivals	Departures	Balance
Ma'ale Adumim	962	1,464	-502	Dolev	42	68	-26
Efrat	325	457	-132	Carmel	18	42	-24
Beit El	173	303	-130	Itamar	67	89	-22
Modi'in Illit	1,434	1,538	-104	Tene	29	50	-21
Immanuel	133	225	-92	Ma'ale Levona	16	36	-20
Psagot	46	135	-89	Ma'ale Mikhmas	60	77	-17
Alfei Menashe	264	343	-79	Bat Ayin	56	71	-15
Ofra	78	150	-72	Einav	50	62	-12
Mitzpe Yeriho	64	126	-62	Shademot Mehola	25	35	-10
Eli	237	296	-59	Allon Shvut	183	193	-10
Hinanit	69	128	-59	Elazar	127	136	-9
Halamish	34	77	-43	Ma'on	14	19	-5
Allon Moreh	72	113	-41	Shavei Shomron	41	46	-5
Bracha	91	132	-41	Eshkolot	12	17	-5
Givon Hahadasha	68	107	-39	Kalia	13	17	-4
Yakir	50	85	-35	Migdal Oz	42	46	-4
Kiryat Arba	364	397	-33	Neve Daniel	73	77	-4
Rosh Tzurim	9	41	-32	Mehola	31	34	-3
Beit Horon	44	74	-30	Kfar Etzion	22	25	-3
Carmeil Tzur	29	58	-29	Netiv Hagdud	5	8	-3
Susiya	51	78	-27	Pnei Hever	14	15	-1
Elkana	223	250	-27	Petza'el	13	14	-1

Map 21: Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria with a Negative Migration Balance, 2015



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To summarize our examination of the Israeli population in the West Bank, it is clear that this population does not enjoy spatial or demographic dominance, even in parts of the area. Recent decades have seen a decline in the settlement enterprise: lower growth rates, a fall in building starts, lower migration into the area, and a reliance on the two Haredi cities that do not share the ideology of the nationalist and messianic sector.

Built-Up Area

A study conducted in 2010 by the Macro Center for Political Economics and the Palestinian Panorama Institute found that 93 percent of Israeli construction in the West Bank is for residential purposes and public buildings, seven percent is for industry, and 0.00016 percent is for agriculture. Eighty-five percent of the settlements do not have craft or agricultural areas.³⁹ The Jewish built-up area now totals 70.9 sq. km., accounting for 1.2 percent of the area of the West Bank (including 12.8 sq. km. in East Jerusalem). The Palestinian built-up area totals 531.9 sq. km., accounting for nine percent of the area of the West Bank (including 17.5 sq. km. in East Jerusalem).

The Road System

Most of the Jewish settlements were located in areas of political importance, and often in areas isolated from other settlements and from transportation infrastructures. As a result, Israel invested extensive resources in order to connect these settlements to the existing roads.⁴⁰ Israel also built a network of arterial roads connecting the Jewish settlements to Israel, thereby dissecting the West Bank with five lateral highways: “Trans-Samaria” (Route 5/505), “Trans-Binyamin” (Route 443), Route 1 – East (from Jerusalem to the Jordan Valley), “Trans-Etzion” (Route 357), and “Trans-Judea” (Route 35). In addition, for security and settlements purposes, Israel completed the Jordan Valley Highway (Route 90) during the early years following the Six Day War, adding a section from Ein Gedi to Ein Fashkha. The “Allon Highway” (Route 80) was constructed along the eastern slopes of the Samaritan mountains and the north of Judea. This superimposed network has a number of distinctive features:

- It was built as a separate system primarily serving the Jewish settlements, and bypassing many Palestinian communities.
- The system does not take into consideration or integrate with the historical road super zone in the area.

³⁹ After Annapolis Application of the Panorama-Macro Jewish Settlements Database, in reparation of the Palestinian State’s West Bank Development Plan, 2010.

⁴⁰ By way of example, an eight-kilometer road was built in mountainous terrain in order Ma’ale Levona to Route 60.

- The system is not adapted to the general topography and physical structure of the region.
- The system mainly serves an extremely small population of Israelis living in small and isolated settlements.
- It crosses land belong to Palestinian communities that was confiscated or seized by military orders.
- It lacks an orderly hierarchy of roads with distinct transportation functions.⁴¹

Israelis do not normally use 64.3 percent of the roads in the West Bank (2,218 kilometers). Israelis who do not live in Judea and Samaria use only 11.2 percent of the roads in the area (386 kilometers).

Employment of Israelis

According to CBS figures, approximately 60 percent of the Israeli workforce in the Judea and Samaria District works inside the Green Line.

Table 13: Employment Rates and Place of Employment, Residents of the Judea and Samaria District

Year	No. of Israelis in Judea & Samaria	No. in employment (% of total)	In District (%)	Outside District (%)
2006	261,600	85,800 (33%)	35,500 (41%) (%41)	50,300 (59%)
2007	276,100	92,700 (34%)	39,600 (43%)	53,100 (57%)
2008	290,400	97,600 (34%)	39,400 (40%)	58,200 (60%)
2009	296,700	103,500 (35%)	(41,800 (40%))	61,700 (60%)
2010	311,100	105,000 (34%)	43,400 (41%)	61,600 (59%)
2011	325,500	106,700 (33%)	44,600 (42%)	62,100 (58%)
2012	341,400	124,400 (36%)	50,100 (40%)	74,300 (60%)
2013	356,500	126,600 (36%)	53,300 (42%)	73,300 (58%)
2014	370,700	138,100 (37%)	58,100 (42%)	80,000 (58%)
2015	385,900	144,400 (37%)	58,000 (40%)	86,400 (60%)

According to the Statistical Yearbook for Judea and Samaria, the CBS’s Social Survey for 2014 shows that the rate of participation in the workforce in the Judea and Samaria is higher than the average in Israel (70.5 percent compared to 64.2 percent). Women’s participation in the civilian workforce in Judea and Samaria is the highest in Israel, and significantly higher than other districts (73.5 percent compared to the national average of 59.5 percent). The proportion of persons not in employment in

⁴¹ Efrat (2002).

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the district, according to the same survey, is lower than elsewhere – 5.7 percent, compared to the national average of 5.9 percent. However, the proportion of those in full employment among residents of Judea and Samaria is below the national average. The proportion of persons in salaried employment in the district is similar to that among the Jewish population in Israel, while the proportion of self-employed persons in the district is significantly higher than the national average for the Jewish sector.⁴²

Table 14: Workforce Data for the Judea and Samaria District

#	Parameter	2012		2014	
		Judea & Samaria	Nat. Avg.	Judea & Samaria	Nat. Avg.
1	Participation in workforce	63.9 (2)	59.5	70.5	64.2
2	Women's participation in workforce	64.1 (1)	51.3	73.5	59.5
3	Not in employment	4.5 (2)	4.8	5.7	5.9
4	Salaried employees	87.3	87.2	.1.κ	.1.κ
5	Self-employed	8.3	7.1	.1.κ	.1.κ
6	Education	25	12.7	23.5	12.4
7	Industry	10.1	15.7	7.7	12
8	Commerce	9.1	13.7	8.5	11.6
9	Liberal and technical professions	21.4	16.1	No data	No data
10	Academics	14.6	15.5	No data	No data

⁴² Central Bureau of Statistics, *Manpower Survey, 2013*, Tables 1.22, 1.23, 2.7, 2.19 (in Hebrew); Central Bureau of Statistics, *Israel Statistical Yearbook 2015*, Tables 12.4, 12.14, 12.15 (in Hebrew).


An examination of professional breakdown by the sector in which Jewish residents are employed shows that the proportion of those employed in education in the Judea and Samaria District is double the national proportion in Israel. Conversely, the proportion of residents employed in industry and commerce in the Judea District is significantly lower than the national average.⁴³

An examination of the breakdown of employment by vocation shows that the proportion of liberal and technical professionals in Judea and Samaria is significantly higher than the average for the Jewish population in Israel. The proportion of academics is slightly below the national average.

Jewish industrial zones – there are 11 district industrial zones in the West Zone, as well as 18 local zones. These zones include a total of 773 factories and 325 additional businesses. Almost all the employees (approximately 27,000) are Palestinians.

⁴³ D. Soen & V. Ne'eman-Haviv, *Statistical Yearbook: Judea and Samaria 2009* (Ariel: Ariel University Publishers) (in Hebrew).

Map 22: Jewish Industrial Zones in the West Bank




Jewish agriculture – the following statistics emerge concerning Jewish agriculture in the West Bank:⁴⁴

Jewish agriculture in the West Bank occupies a total area of approximately 93,000 dunams, and includes two models:

1. **Jewish agriculture on the central mountain ridge (15 percent):** Jewish agriculture in this area is based mainly on vineyards, olive groves, and orchards, with an emphasis on fruits that can survive the relatively cold winter in the area. However, most of the Jewish settlements in this area were originally established as urban communities and not as agricultural settlements
2. **Jewish agriculture in the Jordan Valley and Northern Dead Sea (85 percent):** The Jewish settlements in this area were originally established as agricultural communities. Jewish agriculture in this area mainly includes date groves, field crops, and hothouse agriculture adapted to the hot, humid climate. The Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley area have a population of 9,500, organized in two Israeli regional councils: Arvot Hayarden and Megillot – Dead Sea, with a total joint area of around 1.5 million dunams. Most of the agricultural land in the area was transferred to the Jewish settlements for farming. In addition, Military Order 151 (enacted in 1967) closed off the entire border area between the West Bank and the Kingdom of Jordan, an area of 170,000 dunams, of which some 50,000 dunams are under private Palestinian ownership. Palestinians are only permitted to enter this area with a special permit granted by the military commander..

⁴⁴ Dror Etkes, *Kerem Navot: Israeli Settler Agriculture as a Means of Land Takeover in the West Bank* (2013): <http://rhr.org.il/heb/wp-content/uploads/Kerem-Navot.pdf> (accessed 17 July 2017).

Map 23: Jewish Agricultural Areas in the Jordan Valley



2.

Conclusion

Each of the four plans failed almost completely to secure its intended objectives within its set timescale and defined areas. The failure of the **Allon Plan**, together with other political factors, was reflected in the fact that during the negotiations with the PLO (2001-2014),⁴⁵ Israel refrained from demanding to annex all or part of the Jordan Valley. At the most, it proposed a temporary Israeli military presence in the area.

In the Great Jerusalem Triangle, the plans were relatively successful. Nevertheless, this area still has sizable Arab minority of almost 50 percent. The Palestinian population enjoys full spatial control outside the blocs of Jewish settlements, all of which (with the exception of Gush Etzion) are urban settlements. The deployment of Jewish settlement in this area dictated the Israeli proposal for the border line during the negotiations for a permanent agreement. During the Annapolis process (2008), Prime Minister Ehud Olmert proposed land swaps totaling 380 sq. km., including 227 sq. km. (60 percent) in this area: the Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, Gush Etzion, Ma'ale Adumim, Givat Ze'ev, Modi'in Illit, and Latrun. The Palestinian proposal submitted by Mahmud Abbas proposed land swaps of 122 sq. km., including 90 sq. km. (73 percent) in this area.

The **Sharon Plan** enjoyed a measure of success in two respects. Firstly, Jewish settlements that were initially no more than a cluster of caravans or permanent buildings served as the basis for an increase in the number of Israelis living in the settlements, sometimes by a factor of several times, over recent decades. Secondly, the Jewish settlements built on the western slopes of Samaria will be annexed to Israel in a permanent agreement, as part of a land swap. However, this plan also failed to secure Jewish demographic or spatial dominance in any of the defined settlement areas. Former Prime Minister Ehud Barak recognized this fact, writing in 2005 that: "Sharon's plan was to deploy so many settlements at so many points in Judea and Samaria that a Palestinian state could never be established. But this plan was actually foolish. Sharon's isolated settlements did not strengthen the settlement blocs, but weakened them. Sharon's isolated settlements were a classic example of

⁴⁵ At the Camp David summit in July 2000, Prime Minister Ehud Barak presented an Israeli proposal to annex part of the Jordan Valley and Northern Dead Sea, and to lease one-fourth of the Jordan Valley for several years (Arieli 2013). From the Taba Conference (January 2001) and through the visits to the region by US Secretary of State John Kerry, Israel did not present any further claims to annex the Jordan Valley.

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biting off more than you can chew.”⁴⁶ During the negotiations, Israel did not demand the annexation of even a single settlement area in its entirety.

The findings show that the **Droble Plan** failed both in terms of the number of new settlements established and in terms of population growth, despite considerable investments to this end.

The **Super Zones Plan** was successful in increasing the number of Jewish settlements, albeit far below its forecasts. The plan also managed to increase the proportion of Jews in the super zones (with the exception of the Jordan Valley), and even managed to create a slender Jewish majority in the Jerusalem Envelope. However, it should be recalled that these super zones were defined artificially on the basis of the presence of Jewish settlements and Palestinian agricultural areas, while ignoring large Arab communities in the same geographical area. For example, Bethlehem and its surroundings were left out of the Jerusalem Envelope, despite its location in the center of this super zone.

Today, following the launching and partial implementation of these four plans, the Jewish population density in Judea and Samaria (excluding East Jerusalem) is 63 per sq. km. Palestinian population density is eight times higher, at 460 persons per sq. km. The Jewish population density is similar to that of deserts or peripheral regions. The deployment of Jewish settlements is so diffuse that it has not created cohesive and consolidated settlement in almost any area. The hierarchy of settlements does not reflect the required balance between urban settlements and rural communities. Territorial deployment requires a moderate hierarchical structure of cities and villages of varying sizes. As Table 15 shows, 86.5 percent of the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria are small settlements concentrated in six regional councils that are home to just 34.7 percent of the total Jewish population in the West Bank. To put it another way: most of the Jewish settlements are home to an average of just 250 families. The four Jewish cities in the West Bank concentrate almost half the Israeli population, yet none of them serves as a regional city. Ariel is too small and the students at the university come from throughout Israel and stay in the city for a limited period. Modi'in Illit and Beitar Illit are large cities, but do not create any dimension of settlement consolidation with the surrounding religious and secular settlements, relying instead on their affinity with their fellow Haredi communities inside the Green Line. Ma'ale Adumim lacks a settlement periphery and is entirely dependent on Jerusalem.

⁴⁶ Ari Shavit, “Ehud Barak: Believe Me, Don’t Believe Sharon,” *Haaretz*, 19 May 2005.

Table 15: Settlements and Population in Judea & Samaria (December 2016)

Type of Settlement	No. of Settlements (%)	Population (000s, %)
City	4 (32.%)	183.9 (43.7%)
Local council	13 (10.3%)	91 (21.6%)
Settlement in a regional council (6)	109 (86.5%)	146 (34.7%)
Total	126 (100%)	420.9 (100%)

Setting aside political and legal aspects, all four settlement plans failed to secure their strategic goal: to create demographic and spatial conditions permitting the annexation of the West Bank without abandoning the Zionist vision of a democratic state of the Jewish people. This goal required the maintenance of a secure Jewish majority in the areas formerly included in the British Mandate. The plans were formulated on the basis of security, ideological, and political considerations, resulting in the development of a settlement format that was sharply inconsistent with the geographical conditions in the area. This system is essentially ancillary and marginal, with glaring geographical disadvantages in terms of topographical location, proximity to agricultural land and water sources, and access to the main transportation arteries. Israel’s perception of the settlement system as one focusing on peripheral regions, for security reasons (among others), encouraged the system to develop with a marginal and suburban character inconsistent with the general principles of geographical settlement. In order to connect this system, Israel was forced to build a separate grid of roads and services, duplicating the existing network and imposing an artificial system whose entire existence was due solely to Israel’s political interests.⁴⁷

Over the years, Jewish settlement in the West Bank has created a diffuse system inserting wedges into blocs of Palestinian rural settlement. However, this system has not secured Jewish dominance – neither in terms of the scale of the Jewish population relative to the Palestinian population, nor in terms of the total area actually occupied by the Jewish settlements in the four main settlement areas (the eastern super zone in the Jordan Valley and Judean Desert; the western super zone along the Green Line; the Jerusalem Envelope; and the central mountain ridge along the arterial highway Route 60. The network of Jewish settlements parallels the Palestinian system, but does not complement it, in a manner similar to that throughout Palestine in 1947. The Jewish settlements in the West Bank differ from their Arab neighbors in three key respects:

⁴⁷ Efrat (2002).

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1. They are based on urban settlement. Few of their residents are engaged in industry, and very few are engaged in agriculture.
2. They are deployed along mountain ridges and on hills, in a manner similar to military outposts. By contrast, the Arab communities are located on the slopes. This approach continues the policy formulated by Ben Gurion following the 1948 War.
3. They are supported by a separate road system lacking any hierarchical structure.

Gush Etzion, to the southwest of Jerusalem, is the only area where Jewish settlement has managed to create spatial and demographic control. Only blocs based on cities have been able to create a measure of cohesion, as in the case of Ma'ale Adumim and Givat Ze'ev, both of which depend on Jerusalem. The Jewish settlements have not significantly widened Israel's narrow waist in the center of the country; neither have they significantly widened the Jerusalem Corridor.⁴⁸

This study shows that Israeli settlement has certainly established physical facts on the ground in the West Bank. However, these facts cannot justify in demographic or spatial terms the annexation of the area to the State of Israel, without damaging Israel's character and identity. The highly disperse nature of Jewish settlement, motivated primarily by the desire to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state, has actually impaired the ability to create a Jewish majority and spatial control in any of the defined settlement and security areas. Accordingly, the delineation of the future border between Israel and Palestine is made, and will be made, in accordance with the existing deployment. The result will be a convoluted and very long border that will bring most of the Israelis living beyond the Green Line under Israeli sovereignty, while conversely penetrating into the State of Israel in order to transfer alternative areas to Palestine. Depending on the selected border regime and the nature of the relationship between the two countries, this border is liable to suffer from instability and to require the allocation of substantial resources for security and management.

⁴⁸ Efrat (2002).

Epilogue

In 1967 the Israeli government was intoxicated by the dazzling military victory in the war. The government was dominated by the Labor Zionists who had ruled Israel since independence, and during the preceding period of the Yishuv (the organized Jewish community in Palestine). The Labor Zionist movement had seen that it was successful in securing international recognition for its military conquests, as for example in Security Council Resolution 242, despite the fact that such recognition is contrary to article 2 of the United Nations Charter, which rejects the use of force to such ends.⁴⁹ Israel internalized the recognition that it had managed to create an irreversible reality in areas occupied in the 1948 War that were originally intended to be part of the Arab state or of the *corpus separatum* in Jerusalem by ensuring Jewish demographic and spatial dominance in these areas (see Figure 2).⁵⁰


However, it was a mistake to compare Israel's conduct and the outcome of the 1948 War with the results of the 1967 War, and to draw conclusions regarding Israel's ability to create facts in the territory occupied in the latter war. In 1949, Israel's ability to maintain a Jewish majority (and thereby to preserve both its Jewish and its democratic character) was based on two key factors. The first was the phenomenon of the Palestinian refugees, which led to a sudden and dramatic fall in the number of Arabs in the new and expanded territory, from approximately 800,000 to just 160,000. The second was Jewish immigration, consisting mainly of Holocaust survivors and Jews from North Africa, Iraq, and Iran. These two factors enabled Israel to maintain the new demographic balance of 84%/16% in favor of the Jews through 1967.⁵¹

⁴⁹ The cornerstone for the position of international law concerning the use of force is established in article 2(4) of the United Nations Convention, which states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

⁵⁰ For further details, see Shaul Arieli & Michael Sfard, *Wall and Failure* (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Aliyat Hagag and Yediot Acharonot, 2008), Chapter 8, pp. 229-49 (in Hebrew).

⁵¹ It is worth emphasizing the three basic principles for Jewish settlement following 1948: (1) The imposition of Israeli law and administration on the occupied territories; (2) The granting of full citizenship to the residents of these areas; (3) The transfer of absentee land to the Development Authority (1951) and the Israel Lands Administration (1960).

Figure 4: Shaping the Post-1948 Reality⁵²



These two critical factors have not applied in the West Bank or Gaza Strip from 1967 to date.⁵³ Although some 250,000 Palestinians left the West Bank for Jordan during the 1967 War, the Palestinians who remained constituted a sufficient demographic deterrent to any Israeli ambition to annex the area. Over the years that have followed, the Arab population has experience waves of emigration to the Arab countries and elsewhere, for economic and other reasons. Nevertheless, the Palestinian population in the West Bank has risen constantly, and now numbers


⁵² Source: Ehud Ein Gil, "What Aspects of the Partition Plan Still Apply?" *Haaretz*, 25 November 2015.

⁵³ After 1967, settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was guided by three principles diametrically opposed to those detailed in note 53 above: (1) A refusal to impose Israeli law and administration on the occupied territories (with the exception of East Jerusalem); (2) A refusal to grant full citizenship to the residents of these areas (including East Jerusalem); (3) The management of land in accordance with the rules of law (Fourth Geneva Convention, 1907 Hague Regulations).

some 2.67 million (excluding East Jerusalem). The population of the Gaza Strip is approximately 1.9 million.⁵⁴

The attempt since 1967, and more forcefully in recent years, to change the demographic and spatial reality in the West Bank rests on flimsy foundations. Israel has enjoyed further waves of immigration, peaking with the arrival of some one million immigrants from the Former Soviet Union during the 1990s, but this has not been sufficient to create a substantial Jewish majority within the borders of the former British Mandate in Palestine.

Figure 5: Distribution of Jews by Country, 2015⁵⁵




Over half the Jews in the world now live in Israel. Forty percent live in the United States, and the remainder are dispersed around the developed world. Jewish immigration to Israel is negligible, and this situation is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, Israel must decide on its identity and form of government on the basis of the scenarios summarized in Figure 6.

⁵⁴ For further discussion, see Arieli & Sfard, Chapter 9, pp. 250-89.

⁵⁵ Source: Sergio Della Pergola, 2015.

Figure 6: Percentage of Jews according to Various Territorial Scenarios, 2015⁵⁶



Israel's ability to change the reality in the spatial dimension is similarly limited. Israel enjoys control of regulated state land, and in the late 1970s began a survey that has enabled it to declare an additional 800,000 dunams of declared state land, some of which can be allocated for Jewish settlement. However, the majority of the land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and particularly the majority of fertile land, is owned by Palestinians or subject to Palestinian rights of use.

Following the failure of the Oslo process to lead to an agreed separation and a permanent resolution of the conflict, Prime Minister Sharon was the first to acknowledge the failure of the settlement enterprise. In a speech just before the implementation of his Disengagement Plan, Sharon declared: "The time has come. We are beginning the hardest and most painful step of all: the evacuation of our settlements from the Gaza Strip and Northern Samaria... It is no secret that I, too, like many others, believed and hoped that we could hold on to Netzarim and Kfar Darom forever. But the changing reality in the Land, the region, and the world required us to change our evaluation and our position."

Sharon explained his decision in the following terms:

"It is not possible to hold on to Gaza forever. Over two million Palestinians live there now, and the population is doubling itself each generation. They are crammed in

⁵⁶ Source: Sergio Della Pergola, 2015. Dark = Jews. Light = Non-Jews of Jewish descent who immigrated to Israel under the Law of Return.

incredible congestion in refugee camps, in poverty and distress, in hothouses of growing hatred, without any horizon of hope.”⁵⁷

Sharon did not confine himself to evacuating all 17 Jewish settlements from the Gaza Strip. He also planned to evacuate a similar number of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, while constructing the Separation Barrier in order to create Palestinian contiguity in the West Bank. Various considerations eventually led him to confine this plan to just four settlements (Gannim, Kadim, Homesh, and Sa-Nur).


Prime Minister Sharon explicitly referred to the ethnic consideration in the context of determining the course of the Separation Barrier: “The demographic consideration played an important part in determining the course of the Separation Barrier, due to concern at annexing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who would join together with the Israeli Arabs...”⁵⁸ His successor, Ehud Olmert, remarked while presenting his government to the Knesset on 4 May 2006 that separation is “a lifeline for Zionism.” Olmert’s election campaign was based on the idea of “ingathering” – determining a border based on the Separation Barrier, evacuating Jewish settlements beyond the barrier, while developing and intensifying the Jewish settlements on the “Israeli” side of the barrier.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ NRG Ma’ariv editorial “I also Hoped to Hold on to Netzarim,” *NRG Ma’ariv*, 15 August 2005.

⁵⁸ Aluf Ben & Yossi Verter, “King Solomon also Conceded Territory,” *Ha’aretz*, 22 April 2008.

⁵⁹ Aluf Ben, “A Different Look at the Settlements: From Control of Dominant Territory to a Solution for Social Problems,” *Adkan Estrategi*, Vol. 11, issue 2 (October 2008), 39-50 (in Hebrew).

Map 24: Plan for the Evacuation of Jewish Settlements in the West Bank as Part of the Disengagement Plan (Illustration)



In an article published in Ha'aretz in 2005, the journalist Doron Rosenblum explained that the infeasibility of demographic and spatial change in the West Bank showed that the settlement enterprise was an illusion, rather than a vision:

“The governments of Israel have become a captive audience, pulled after the settlers or encouraging them, although it was clear to any rational person that the rules of melodrama, dominated by primeval emotions and desires, exist on a different plane from reality, which is subject to the laws of nature, statistics, demographics, and geography. But the pseudo-pioneering character of the settlers led the entire Israeli political establishment into an area of magic thought: vague, fatalistic, “faith-based” thought, somewhat childlike, with an anticipation that things would work out somehow, that “time would do its bit” and “the Americans will sort things out.” You only need to look at a map of the Gush Katif settlements [...] to recognize that the “insanity” is not confined to the Youths of the Hilltops. Really, what did the Yisrael Galilis and the Yigal Alons who stuck them there think they were doing? And what were the Shimon Pereses and Ariel Sharons thinking when they encouraged the Sebastias and the Kedumim? Did they imagine they would be able to overrule demography, geography, and topography? Did they think that millions of Palestinians would simply vanish because they were “surrounded” by fortified enclaves? Did they anticipate that the Great Rift Valley would create a new twist of land connecting Netzarim and Ashkelon? The sin of these Mapainiks is, perhaps, all the greater since they expected a miracle without even believing in God.”

The Israeli settlement enterprise was, in reality, a pretentious scheme that sought to realize security, religious, and historical ambitions. Enormous budgets were invested to this end. The plans that sought to realize these goals failed one by one in the face of the demographic and physical reality that the Palestinian population has managed to maintain from 1967 to date.

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