

Lessons from East Asia for the Middle East Peace Process

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This intellectual exercise may sound both futile and far-fetched – because the timing does not seem to be propitious and because of the much discussed issue of uniqueness and comparability. The answer to the question, “why futile,” can easily be answered with another question, “what peace process? Whereas Japan has succeeded in coping with the residue of mistrust toward her among most of her Asian neighbors and carving out for itself a respectable position in Asia, Israel still has a long way to go toward winning the trust of its Middle East neighbors; in particular now that the process of negotiations with the Palestinians has been derailed and the whole Middle East seems to be on the verge of enormous conflagration.

It may sound “farfetched because it is often argued that Japan and Israel are unique, thus incomparable, as are the Middle East and East Asia; comparing them and drawing lessons from one to the other is like “comparing apples and oranges.”

The exercise is worthwhile nonetheless – because lessons might be drawn from failures, not only from successes, and because by now the issue of Japanese and Israeli uniqueness has been proven to be a red herring. One example in the case of Japan is the book by Professor Sheldon Garon, our keynote speaker, about trans-national history of the propensity to save in industrial democracies, Japan included. Indeed, the Peace Process with the Palestinians has yet to get back on track, but the peace with Egypt and Jordan, albeit “cold,” holds, and what might be called an “unofficial cold peace” with other Arab states in the Gulf and North Africa has been in existence for several years. Of course, doubts as to how long the “cold peace” would hold in view of the so-called “Arab Spring” in Egypt and apprehensions about the Arab Spring expanding to Jordan, where the power of the Moslem Brotherhood has been rising and the government has started an opening with the Hamas in Gaza, shouldn’t be overlooked.

Japan and Israel are different in many ways as are the Middle East and East Asia. I could spend the whole twenty minutes allocated to me enumerating the differences. But recent studies have shown that despite the differences, these states and regions are comparable. It is not coincidental that some of the leading authors of the spate of books and articles on “transitions to peace” in various regions of the world and related themes have been Israeli

scholars (e.g., Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Arie Kacovics, Benny Miller, Galia Press Barnathan) and "Diaspora Israeli scholars" (i.e., Emanuel Adler and Etel Solingen). The issue of transitions to peace is an existential one for us, and it is natural for us to seek and create knowledge in this respect, and draw some realistic lessons from this intellectual enterprise. Thus, our objective is to try to draw lessons regarding the transition to "cold peace" with the Palestinians, and to a higher level of peace, known as "normal peace", with other Arab states.

In the late 1990s, when the peace process with the Palestinians still had seemed to be on track, I took up the issue of comparing Japanese and Israeli efforts to establish peaceful relations with their respective former enemies and reached some tentative conclusions. More recently, Galia Press Barnathan published an excellent theoretically oriented in-depth study titled, *The Political Economy of the Transitions to Peace*, in which she compares transitions to peace in the Middle East, Europe, and East Asia.

The following is based on my earlier analysis, Barnathan's book, and my review of recent developments. Because of the time constraint, I first mention in an outline form some of the dimensions of factors affecting (positively or negatively) the incentives of former enemies to transition from enmity to cold peace and from cold peace to normal peace, and then give some illustrations from the Japanese experience, and draw some conclusions for Israeli-Arab relations. Signs of transitions from cold peace to warm peace have yet to appear on the horizon, but we should not lose hope that such signs might appear sometime.

DIMENSIONS

The dimensions are: political/security, economic, and the style of political and economic diplomacy.

Political/security

The political/security dimension includes legitimacy deficits, intensity of territorial disputes, regime types, and third-power involvement.

Legitimacy Deficits

Israel has yet to win legitimacy from several Arab states and organizations as an independent state in recognized and secure borders, let alone as participant in regional economic, political, and security projects. Japan had had to regain legitimacy from its Asian neighbors she occupied and mistreated during the War as a leading participant in regional economic, political, and security projects.

Intensity of Territorial Disputes: high (Israel) – low (Japan)

Related to the legitimacy deficit, Israel has intense territorial disputes with the Palestinians, especially the Hamas, and with Syria, and with Hizbulla in Lebanon. The dispute with the Hamas and Lebanon has been hot, involving military hostilities; with Syria it has been relatively cold in that no exchange of fire has been involved since the October War of 1973, and especially since 1976, when Israel acquiesced in Syria's control of Lebanon following its crushing of the Palestinian forces there; relatively, save for the Israeli destruction of the nuclear power plant in the Syrian Desert in 2007. Japan has had territorial disputes with the Soviet Union/Russia (hereafter Russia), with the People's Republic of China (China) and the Republic of China (Taiwan), and with South and North Korea. The dispute with Russia has been over islands north of Hokkaido (Habomai, Shikotan, Etorofu and Kunashiri) wrested from Japan by the then Soviet Union during the last days of the Pacific War, when the Soviet Union abrogated its non-aggression pact with Japan, in order to share the spoils of the Allied forces victory over Japan. The Japanese call them the "Northern Territories"; the Russians refer to these territories as the Southern Kuriles. Russian refusal to return the territories to Japanese sovereignty has prevented the signing of a full-fledged peace and friendship treaty between Japan and Russia to this day. But since the signing of the Joint Declaration by the two governments in 1956 diplomatic relations have been restored, and following the end of the Cold War and once the domestic disorder and uncertainty in the wake of the implosion of the Soviet Union has subsided and Russian governance stabilized, the volume and diversity of economic relations between the two countries have increased. So far, intermittent efforts to reach a solution have failed, and there have been sporadic flare ups of tension; but the tensions subside, because both sides are interested in keeping the dispute at a low intensity level. The dispute with China and Taiwan has been over the uninhabited groups of tiny islands in the East China Sea controlled by Japan but sovereignty over them is claimed by both China and Taiwan. The Japanese call them Senkaku and the Chinese call them Diaoyutai. The dispute with the two Koreas is over what the Japanese call Takeshima and the Koreans call Dokdo. The disputed territory in question, also known as Lincourt Rocks, consists of two small islands and about 30 smaller rocks. Since 1954, they have been occupied by South Korea, which keeps a coast guard station there. As in the case of the dispute with Russia, also in the case of the Japan's dispute with China/Taiwan and the Koreas, sporadic tensions have flared up, but subsided. Japan and the other contenders variously put forward claims of history, geography, international law, and international "justice," and the issues remain a sore spot in Japan's international relations, but these disputes are by far lower in intensity compared with Israel's territorial disputes with its neighbors. The higher the intensity of territorial disputes, the more powerful are political considerations likely to dominate the calculations of at least one of the former enemies.

Regime Types

From the point of view of democratic Japan and Israel, the type of regime of the former enemy affects the type of peace Japan and Israel could achieve with them. Authoritarian and pseudo-democratic regimes can transition to cold peace irrespective of the position of the general public on that matter, i.e., even where the general public opposes to it. For a normal peace, public support, not only acquiescence, is required. Japan and Israel achieved cold peace with South Korea (during its pre-democratic period), and pseudo-democratic Egypt and Jordan, respectively; but as the case of Japan-South Korea relations indicates, movement toward normal peace had to wait until South Korea democratized. Moreover, as the Egyptian case suggests, at an earlier stage of democratization, where public discourse starts to matter, opposition from “below” can gain more weight and hamper progress toward normal peace.

Third Power Involvement

In the cases of both Japan’s and Israel’s movement toward peace, the US has played some role. Until the US terminated its boycott of China and consented to China’s admission to the United Nations, ousting of Taiwan, and replacement of Taiwan as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Japan was forced by the US to refrain from establishing diplomatic relations and limit its economic relations with China. Political relations were tense, and while Japan preferred to separate economic and politics (*seikei bunri*), China used economic measures to pressure Japan whenever political tensions mounted. In 1972 Japan-China, with the consent of the US, “normalized” their relations, in that Japan and China established diplomatic relations, Japan severed its diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and Japan-China economic cooperation expanded and diversified (but the relations did not amount to movement to “normal peace” defined above). Japan has informally maintained its relations with Taiwan at all levels. In 1978, Japan and China signed a full-fledged Peace and Friendship Treaty. By now it can be said that Japan and China have reached the stage of normal peace, but Japan-China relations are part of triangular – US, China, Japan – relations, where US-Japan alliance (Security Treaty; signed in 1951, revised in 1960) guarantees Japan’s security vis-à-vis China, but impedes a possible move of Japan and China toward a warm peace. Japan-Taiwan relations have progressed past the normal peace toward warm peace, for two main reasons. First, the residue of Japanese colonization from 1895 (end of first Sino-Japanese War) to 1945 (Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War) has been much less bitter both by the Taiwanese elite and the public, Taiwanese have been willing to admit that the Japanese colonial regime had developed Taiwan’s industrial infrastructure, and amicable interpersonal and inter-organizational Japanese-Taiwanese ties

during the colonial period have continued and strengthened in the postwar era. Second, and just as important has been the triangular US-Japan-Taiwan relations, starting with the early 1950s when the US pressured Taiwan's Chiang Kai-shek to "show magnanimity" and give up reparations from Japan.

In another context, the US-Japan alliance, notably the continued stationing of US forces in US bases in Japan, has had an important effect, not only in guaranteeing Japanese security, but also allaying Japan's neighbors' apprehensions of possible resurgence of Japanese militarism and imperialism as Japan had become an economic superpower by the early 1970s – what an American general called "a cork in the bottle." This has made it easier for Japan to convince its neighbors that its motivations are non-military, purely friendly designed to promote mutual interests through multifarious cooperation - as manifested, for example, by the so-called Fukuda Doctrine" addressed in Manila to Japan's neighbors in Southeast Asia by former Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo in 1977.

In Israel-Arab relations, the US has played several roles in the political security dimension. On the one hand, it has provided Israel with arms and technology to enable Israel to defend itself. It had prompted the shift in Egyptian foreign policy from relying on the Soviet Union to relying on the US for military (and economic) support, what facilitated the signing of Israel-Egypt peace treaty. And while helping Israel to maintain its military superiority in the region, in the 1960s and the 1970s the US prevented Israel from taking advantage of its victories in wars for territorial expansion, beyond certain limits set by the US – a "cork in the bottle" of sorts.

Economic

The economic dimensions are international economic power disparity, domestic winners and losers, contribution to regional economic integration, and third party involvement.

Economic Power Disparity

At the point of transition to cold peace there had/have been wide economic disparities between Japan and Israel, on one hand, and their respective neighbors, on the other. The width of these disparities has had an effect on the motivations of the states concerned and the type of peace they have been willing to transition to.

At the end of the Pacific War the Japanese economy was in shambles and until the Korean War (1950-1953), efforts to jump-start the economy had failed. The Korean War gave a strong, but temporary boost to the Japanese economy as Japanese industry provided the US with war-related goods and US military personnel fighting in Korea arrived in Japan for rest and recreation. Then from about 1960 to 1970, the Japanese economy developed by

leaps and bound and became the second largest in the world. Initial Japanese advances into the markets of South Korea and Southeast Asia had been met with apprehension of Japanese economic domination because of the disparity of the size of the economies and gaps in their competitiveness. These apprehensions have subsided once the respective economies have developed and the competitiveness gap has narrowed and self confidence increased, making economic relations more relaxed and smoother.

Shifting its industrial structure from agriculture, to manufacturing for import substitution, to export-oriented manufacturing, to information technology, the Israeli economy has become the most technologically advanced in the Middle East, much more advanced than its immediate neighbors. Moreover, there has been little in the trade relations that the economies of Israel and of its neighbors could complement each other. Thus, like in the Japanese case, the initial euphoria of the Madrid Peace Conference (1991) was replaced by expressions of apprehension on the part of Egypt and Jordan of Israeli uneven advantage and even economic domination. As a result, following the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, the volume of economic relations with Israel has been limited, needing US intervention (to be discussed below) to expand somewhat. The peace with Egypt has been cold; the peace with Jordan has been somewhat warmer but it has way to go before transition to normal peace.

Domestic Winners and Losers

Some gain economically from transition to peace, some don't. This has been related to regime types discussed in the previous section. In the case of Japan and Israel's neighbors, the transition benefitted exclusively, or mostly the ruling elites and their cronies. The rest of the population, feeling that they had not shared the fruits of peace, had impeded the advancement of the peace to a higher level. As the regime has become less authoritarian, or, as in the case of South Korea, democratized, i.e., a wider circle of the population and a larger number of organizations have entered the political process, the fruits of peace have spread "downward" to more people and organizations, resulting in more widespread commitment to maintaining peace and advancing it toward a higher level. It seems that this has been the case even under the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank (even though the Peace Process has yet to get back on track). A major cause of the Fatah defeat by the Hamas in Gaza had been the tremendously uneven sharing of the economic fruits of the Oslo Accords, on one hand, and the decision of the Authority in the West Bank to concentrate on building pre-state political and economic institution and spreading wealth more widely.

Contributing to Regional Economic Integration

The economically-powerful side (Japan, Israel) can contribute to the economic integration of its respective region, serving the economic interests of both sides, and, indirectly, also making a contribution toward regime change

(democratization) by expanding the middle class in the region. The Japanese economy's "return to Asia" started with reparations, which served the interests of the receiving country, but also the Japanese economy in promoting Japanese exports to and investments in Asia. In due course Japanese aid, trade, and investment in the region have come to resemble the pattern of the Japanese domestic market, i.e., horizontal and vertical keiretsu and state-market synergy. The contribution to integration took the form of each Japanese large scale manufacturing firm locating sub-contractors of its different components in different countries in the region, i.e., a regional division of production, and gearing foreign aid to the interests of Japanese firms. Such a pattern promoted not only Japanese trade with and investment in Asia, but also intra-Asian trade more widely. (More on this pattern will appear below, in the context of "sensitivity").

In the Middle East, to promote some level of regional economic integration, third party involvement has been required.

Third Party Involvement

The third power (US) can offer economic, in addition to political/security, incentives (such as a military alliance), or issue threats of withdrawal of economic incentives, to make its involvement in transitions to peace more effective. In East Asia, the US opened its market to products exported from East Asian countries, including products produced by Japanese firms operating in Asia. In Israel-Jordan and Israel-Egypt relations, Japanese involvement has included setting up Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) in Jordan (since 1998) and Egypt (since 2004), to inject some warmth into the cold peace and enhance regional economic integration. Products produced in QIZs, must contain a set percentage of Israeli content (8% in Jordan; 11% with Egypt) in order to enter the US market free of tariffs. While for Israel this measure has mostly had a political value, the boost to the Egyptian economy has been notable.

Style of Political/Economic Diplomacy

The success or failure of efforts of a state with superior economic and military power to play a leading role in its region depends on the way it conveys its intentions to its former enemies, i.e., on its style of diplomacy. Both Japan in early post-US Occupation era and Israel in early post-Madrid Peace Conference era adopted an assertive diplomatic style – and were rebuffed by its neighbors. They came up with visions and initiatives for regional projects in which they would play a leading role in the development of their respective regions. Their former enemies, suspicious of Japan's and Israel's motivations, interpreted the visions and initiatives as a hidden blueprint for subtle domination.

Early post-war Japanese attempts to participate in international organizations for Asian development (the Colombo Plan, ECAFE), even

though Japan had been admitted to membership in global international organizations, such as the ILO, WHO, IMF and later OECD, were given a cold shoulder. Another cases of Japanese over anxiousness ending in failure were the ideas of the Asian Development Fund in the mid 1950s (discussed in Professor Hoshiro Hiroyuki's lecture that follows mine) and of PAFTA (Pacific Free Trade Area) in the 1960s-1970s.

One exception was the establishment of the Asia Development Bank in 1966 openly led by Japan. This case will be taken up below in the context of "sensitivity."

Following the Oslo Accords, the Israeli government and business circles opened a euphoric, good intentioned "offensive" to promote trade and other forms of economic cooperation with Arab countries. But the zeal, assertiveness, and "visions" about an Israel-centered new Middle East overwhelmed, offended, and intimidated the Arabs. For example, in 1995 in Casablanca, Shimon Peres, then Foreign Minister of Israel, told an Arab audience that they would "...see the economic situation improve when Israel takes the reins of leadership in the Middle East."

Drawing the lesson from the failure of its assertive style of diplomacy, Japan has replaced it with what has variously been called, "leading from behind" (Rix), "supportership" (Inoguchi), and "leadership by a light hand" (Katzenstein). Reference is to a style of diplomacy of a state conceiving the idea of and taking the initiative in launching new international actions, projects, organizations and institutions, but staying in the shadows, convincing another state to be in the limelight, ostensibly as the state playing the leading role. I call it "obliging" style of diplomacy, i.e., ostensibly accepting an invitation to participate, but in fact playing a leading role. Example of Japanese "obliging" style were the formation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989 , Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Regional Forum (ARF, focusing on regional security matters) in 1994. In both cases Japan let Australia occupy center stage. The periodic meetings of the ASEAN+3 (Japan, China, and South Korea) may be included in this category.

In view of Arab leaders' resentment of Israeli over eagerness to lead, Israelis have lowered both their profile and the level of their expectations for the near future.

Sensitivity

As noted, the establishment of the Asia Development Bank in 1966 was a case of a successful Japanese attempt to lead openly, rather than from behind. The establishment of the bank was a Japanese idea and initiative, and Japan provided a large share of the bank's finances. But Japan not only had the political support of the US, but also the US provided a share of the bank's

finances equal to that provided by Japan. But not less important were two additional facts. First, the negotiations with Asian leaders were orchestrated by a Japanese former Ministry of Finance high level bureaucrat, with rich international experience and an empathic inter-personal relations demeanor. Second, Japan agreed to have the bank's headquarters located in Manila, rather than in Tokyo.

In this connection, let me point to a case of what its neighbors, especially China, considered to be Japanese arrogance: Japanese reference to the "Flying Geese Model" of economic development and economic integration of East Asia. The geese fly in a hierarchical formation, resembling the head of an arrow; all advance together but remain in the same position in the formation relative to the others. In 1935, the Japanese economist Akamatsu Kaname used that model as a metaphor to describe economic development in East Asia, where the Japanese economy, the most advanced in the region, led the development of the other economies, each one of them starting at a different level of development, and gradually advancing from one stage of development to a higher stage. Japan led a process of regional economic integration through division of labor among economies of different levels of development, involving, among other things, investment and transfer of technology. As indicated above, a similar pattern of East Asian regional integration emerged after the War and came to its most prominent manifestation in the 1980s. By then the hierarchy included Japan at the top, followed by the New Industrializing Economies (NIEs) of South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, followed by the 2nd NIEs of part of the ASEAN members (Malaysia, Thailand), followed by China (after the 1980s China was followed by newly admitted ASEAN members Vietnam and Burma/Myanmar). While all economies benefitted from this pattern of development, criticism was leveled at Japan's refraining from transfer of its most advanced technologies, transferring only lower levels of technology, thus keeping its technological superiority. When Japanese spokespersons used the flying geese metaphor to convince its neighboring countries that the Japanese practice was the best for all concerned, Chinese spokesperson responded that using that metaphor by the Japanese was one manifestation of Japanese arrogant "triumphalism," like the talks of "Pax Nipponica" supposedly replacing "Pax Americana." Instead of a vertical, flying geese model of regional development and integration, they advocated a horizontal model, whereby all participants create production networks based on horizontal patterns of exchange of investment and all levels of technology. In retrospect, it can be said that what is known as the "rise of China" as an economic power in the 1990s and the early 21st Century has indeed taken the form of horizontal regional development where China has been playing a central role, a pattern known as "Bamboo Capitalism."

Another insensitive behavior of some Japanese leaders has been the visits by prime ministers, cabinet ministers, and "ordinary" members of the

Diet to Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. The Yasukuni Shrine, an national Shinto shrine since the Meiji era, but “privatized” after the War in accordance with the separation of state and religion prescribed by the New Constitution (entered into effect in 1947) where the souls of those fallen in wars are enshrined. Visiting the shrine on that day to worship/pay respect to the fallen in wars, especially on August 15th, the day the War ended, and especially since the souls of the 14 top Class-A war criminals sentenced in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the “Tokyo War Crimes Trials”), including not only military, but also civilian leaders, has been interpreted by Japan’s neighbors as signs of the resurgence of Japanese ultra-nationalism. For example, the visits to the shrine by former Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro, declaring that his visits were not as a private individual, but as prime minister, and his argument that the visits were an internal Japanese affair by right, and nobody else’s business, had soured Japan-China relations. His successors have shown the required sensitivity by avoiding such visits, and the relations had improved – until the next flare-up.

Collective Memories

Nations develop collective memories of their past, including of violent conflicts with other nations. Collective memories of conflicts with other nations tend to be tendentious, each nation presenting a narrative that depicts its own past behavior in positive light, absolving itself of being accountable for misbehavior; and not less meaningful, presenting its former enemies’ past behavior in negative light. Tendentious, conflicting collective memories create mutual resentment; and like in the case of conflicting territorial claims, trigger sporadic flare-ups of tensions.

Collective memories are “dynamic,” they change from time to time. And as Thomas Berger has demonstrated, collective memories are only partly a function of history; they also are socio-political – they change in response to changes in the international and domestic environments of the states in point, as are the sporadic flare-up of tensions between them.

The main issues of the conflicting collective memories of Japan’s relations with its former enemies are the oppression of the population of its former colonies (Taiwan and Korea) and atrocities Japan perpetrated in the countries it occupied during the Pacific War, notably the “rape of Nanking,” the biological warfare unit 731 experiments on prisoners of war in Manchuria, and the “comfort women” (enslaved ianfu), mostly Korean and Chinese. The Japanese have been accused of either avoiding or playing down references to Japanese misbehavior during the war, or even of some leaders justifying Japan’s occupation of neighboring countries as a necessary stage in the emancipation of the people of these countries from the yoke of Western imperialism, and emphasize the socio-economic and cultural development of these countries under Japanese leadership. Instead of being emphatic toward

the suffering of others, certain Japanese circles have adopted a “victim mentality,” emphasizing the damage and civilian casualties inflicted on Japanese cities in the last stage of the War, culminating in the dropping of the Atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and claiming the moral high grounds as the only people who have experienced military nuclear devastation. The issues of collective memories have been a sore spot especially in the relations between Japan and China and the two Koreas.

Generally speaking, the main issue in the conflicting collective memories of Israeli Jews, on one hand, and Arabs (in Israel, in the Palestinian Authority, and in Arab countries), on the other, is reflected in the different descriptions/definitions of the first, 1948-49 Arab-Israeli War. The Jews call it the War of Independence, the materializing of the vision of the Zionist Movement, the movement for national liberation of the Jews, in the Jewish ancient homeland. The Arabs call it their catastrophe. The Jews call May 15th, 1948 (the day of the Declaration of Independence) Yom Ha’atsma’ut (the Day of Independence); for the Arabs it is the Nakba (the Day of the Catastrophe). Most notably has been the conflicting narrative of the reason/s why about 650,000 of Arab residents of Palestine left their homes and have become refugees. The Arab narrative has been that the refugees were driven from their homes by force, by threats, and by Jewish atrocities (limited in scale, but powerful enough as warnings of what would happen to those who stayed put). Among Israeli Jews, there have been two narratives. The most salient argument in the early Jewish narrative (in retrospect known as the “Zionist narrative”), has been that the refugees left either because their leaders encouraged them to do so, to temporarily stay out of the way of the advancing Arab armies about to crush the emerging Jewish state, or because they naturally did what people caught in cross-fire in wars do, i.e., pack up and escape out of the war zone, to more secure areas. The Zionist narrative goes on to say that the Jewish authorities not only refrained from driving the refugees away, but also urged the Arab residents of Palestine to stay, and that those who had chosen to stay have been left unharmed; let alone arguing that the emerging Jewish state was a victim of aggression against it, and aggressors have to pay a price.

The Zionist narrative was followed by the “post-Zionist” narrative, sharing some of the arguments of the Arab narrative, most notably the following two arguments: (a) that the Jewish leadership planned to drive the refugees away, and that the forces of the pre-state military organizations of the Jewish Yishuv (settlement) and then by the military forces of the newly-founded Israeli state carried the plan out; and (b) that the Arab leaders in fact encouraged only part of the Arab residents of Palestine to leave. The post-Zionist narrative has been accepted by a gradually increasing percentage of the Israeli Jewish population, albeit not a majority. The post-Zionist narrative has been accompanied by a more empathic view of the plight of the Palestinians.

Forms of Power Projection:

For many years two types of power projection, military and economic, have been practiced by states and identified as such in academic and non-academic public discourses. The identification and discussion of the various aspects of a third type of power projection – soft power - has been in vogue since the publication of a book including this type in its title by Joseph Nye in 1990. To put it simply, while a state, by displaying its superior military capability, can convince other states to cooperate with it, or at least refrain from being hostile to it, by scaring it, clarifying that it would be dangerous for them to the other states in point to act otherwise; and while achieving the same objective by convincing rational other states that they can benefit economically, that it pays to be friendly; soft power means that the state achieves the same objective by making other countries like it – its culture, its form of government, etc.

A great deal has been written about Japan's limited, but gradually increasing projection of its military power abroad (and most recently in space) and about the various forms of Japan's economic power projection. Here I briefly refer to recent forms of Japanese soft power. Probably the most outstanding form of Japanese soft power in recent years has been Japanese popular culture, reflected in the term "cool Japan," which has become a household term far and wide beyond Japan's borders – music, movies, TV programs, "cosplay" (youngsters wearing costumes taken from movies and TV programs), etc. As described in detail in Nissim Otmazgin lecture as part of this panel, initially the popularity of Japanese pop culture, both its contents and manufacturing and distribution strategies, became a major export industry, especially to East Asia, without government help. But in the last several years, the Japanese government, riding on the private sector's success, has discovered popular culture as a potential "soft" foreign policy tool – to make Japan more likeable. In fact, the Japanese has adopted hard-sell measures to promote pop culture as a soft power foreign policy tool. However, so far it does not seem that popular culture has helped to prevent flare ups of political tensions.

Popular culture, while being the most talked about form of Japanese projection of soft power, it is not the only one. In addition to some contents of pop culture addressed universally, two other, related forms have been largely addressed to the Moslem countries in the Middle East and North Africa (especially the oil-rich countries, "naturally"). One form is a model of an alternative, non-Western process of democratization; the other is a demonstration that economic development can be embedded in a non-Western culture, in the broad sense of the term "culture" that, for example, includes religion. It is too early to judge how effective this soft power tool has been, but it would be interesting to assess its effect in the future.

LESSONS

In an outline form, the above discussion of dimensions of transitions to various levels of peace by former enemies, suggests the following lessons for a state with military and economic superiority over former enemies with whom that state seeks to achieve peace and, hopefully, upgrade peace to a higher level.

1. Transitions to “cold peace” and to “normal peace” are possible under different circumstances and require different measures. For example, cold peace can be achieved with an authoritarian regime, but normal peace can be achieved once the former enemy’s regime has become more participatory, i.e., democratic and the sense of winning from peace has spread downward – from the elite to the general population.

2. Don’t expect that economic and soft power projections would solve deeply entrenched controversial political issues.

3. Don’t repeat past mistakes (self evident)

4. Adopt an obliging style of political and economic diplomacy, be sensitive (and wise and accommodating, even when you are certain you are right), and avoid projecting a victim mentality and be emphatic to former enemies’ suffering.

5. Contribute to neighbors’ economic development and regional economic integration, as one way of promoting democratization.

6. Third party (US) involvement should be synchronized with changing circumstances, notably in the transition from cold peace to normal peace.